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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
The Effects of Moral Sensitivity and Moral Climate on Moral Reasoning
by
Marita Louise Mahoney
Master of Arts, Graduate Program in Psychology
Loma Linda University, June 2003
Dr. Kelly R. Morton, Chairperson
As healthcare professionals, psychology students and psychologists are expected
to behave ethically and morally. It is assumed that moral and ethical reasoning in
psychology students develops through exposure to ethical dilemmas within ethics classes
and during clinical training experiences. Rest's Four Component Model of Moral
Behavior, a neo-Kohlbergian approach to understanding moral development, posits an
interaction of Moral Sensitivity, Moral Motivation, Moral Reasoning and Moral
Character. Moral sensitivity, or awareness of a moral dilemma, is posited to cue the
moral reasoning process, though little is known about how the training environment can
facilitate or hamper such developments. Fifty".'two psychology-graduate students were
assessed on moral sensitivity (empathy) and moral reasoning to determine the impact of
the moral climate in clinical supervision. The hypothesis that moral climate, students'
perception of a clinical supervision experience, would either mediate or moderate the
moral sensitivity and moral reasoning relationship was tested with SEM and hierarchical
regression analyses. Moral climate moderated the cognitive empathy and moral
reasoning relationship; however, moral climate neither mediated nor moderated the
affective empathy and moral reasoning relationship. Affective empathy alone is sufficient
to cue the moral reasoning process with moral climate having an additional impact on

x

moral reasoning. Cognitive empathy interacts with the moral climate to cue the moral
reasoning process. Mature perspective taking skills within a dearly defined clinical
relationship experience facilitate the ability to identify and resolve moral dilemmas in
interpersonal situations such as psychotherapy.

Xl

Introduction
A professional code of ethics is adopted to provide guidelines for resolving ethical
and moral dilemmas within that profession's context. In the helping professions, a code
of ethics typically outlines behaviors that are in the best interest of the client or patient.
Specifically, the goal of The Ethical Principles ofPsychologists and Code ofConduct is
to protect clients within clinical and research settings (American Psychological
Association, 1992; 2002; American Psychological Association Ethics Committee,
200lb). However, recent reports of the American Psychological Association (APA)
Ethics Committee indicate that psychologists are not consistently following their
professional code of ethics (2000; 2001b; 2002). Traditionally, such a professional ethics
code is adopted so that the members of the profession are able to monitor themselves
rather than being regulated by an outside governing agency.
In 1999 and 2000, the APA included 88 500 full members and in 2001 89,100 full
11

members (APA Ethics Committee, 2000; 2001 b; 2002). Table 1 presents a summary of
the most recent findings of the APA Ethics Committee (2000; 200lb; 2002), while Table
2 summarizes reasons for membership termination (APA Ethics Committee, 2000; 2001;
2002). These data indicate that despite continued awareness and education, some AP A
members violate the ethical code of conduct. It is interesting to note that one of the most
clearly prohibited behaviors, sexual misconduct, is still violated.
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Table 1

Summary ofRecent APA Ethics Committee Rep_orts
Year

1999

2000

2001

Membership Total

88 500

88 500

89100

Verbal Inquires

308

252

240

Written Complaints

70

90

78

Cases Opened

43

43

42

Membership Termination

28

35

17

Felony Conviction

11.9%

4.9%

5%

Loss of Licensure

57.1%

58.1%

24%

Adult Sexual Misconduct

2.4%

2.3%

12%

Non-sexual Dual Relationship

4.8%

2.3%

10%

Sexual Harassment

0%

2.3%

0%

Child Custody Assessment

9.5%

11.6%

21%

Outside Competence

2.4%

0%

0%

Insurance/fee problems

2.4%

0%

0%

Inappropriate Professional Relations

0%

2.3%

0%

Improper Research Techniques

2.4%

0%

0%

Plagiarism

0%

2.3%

2%

Other

7.2%

6.9%

2%

Violations
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Table 2

Reasons for APA Membershif!. Termination
Primary category for membership tennination

1999

2000

2001

Sexual misconduct, adult

17 (60.7%)

14 (40%)

8 (47.1%)

Sexual misconduct, minor

1 (3.57%)

2 (5.71%)

0

Nonsexual dual relationship

2 (7.14%)

9 (25.71%)

0

3 (10.71%)

7 (20%)

0

Non...cooperation

0

0

3 (17.65%)

Other

5 (17.86%)

3 (8.57%)

6 (35.3%)

Total

28

35

17

Insur~ce/fee

problems

In 1999-2000, the California Board of Psychology received 528 complaints,
opened 139 investigations and sent 46 cases to the District Attorney or Attorney
General's office (California Board of Psychology, 2001). Thirty-three decisions
regarding violations during this time-period included sixteen (48.5%) for gross
negligence/incompetence, five (15.2%) for conviction of a crime, three (9.1 % ) for
dishonesty/fraud, three (9.1%) for discipline by another state board, two (6.1%) for
sexual misconduct, one (3%) for repeated negligent acts, one (3%) for mental illness, one
(3%) for general unprofessional conduct, and one (3%) for probation violation. Although
a member of APA may have their APA membership tenninated it does not automatically
follow that they will lose their license, which is issued by the state. Additionally, a
practicing psychologist does not need to be a member of APA to be licensed. Although
licenses are based on laws not the ethics code, the licensing law does incorporate as
standard of care the APA ethics code. Therefore, it is important to recognize that ethical
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violations may be in reference to a national code of ethics and/or to a state level code of
ethics; however, any ethical violatio~ either at a national code level or a state code level,
may result in harm to the client.
At both the national and state levels, psychologists do not simply base their
decisions on their professional code of ethics. Their professional behavioral choices are
based on personal values and moral systems that may lead them to commit a variety of
ethical violations ranging from poor decisions made during subtle day-to-day practices
regarding confidentiality or boundary violations to clear examples of ethical violations
like a sexual relationship with a client. Principle B of the APA Ethics Code (1992; 2002)
encourages psychologists to be aware of their own values and belief systems and how
these impact their practice of psychology. Higher levels of moral development may
encourage a moral decision making process that protects psychologists from committing
ethical violations.
Moral Development: A Neo-Kohlbergian Approach

Historically, moral development has been viewed as a sequential stage
progression. Kohlberg posited that moral development consisted of six stages, ranging
from lower to advanced critical thinking skills, that cognitive disequilibrium provided the
motivation to move to the next stage; and, that it was not possible prior to the fourth stage
to revert to a lower stage of reasoning (Rest, 1994). That is, prior to stage four, moral
reasoning development only improved. Kohlberg viewed age and experience as primary
factors in determining moral reasoning stage level and hypothesized that a stage is a
cognitive structure that determines consistency in thinking. An underlying assumption is
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that a person will act in congruence with their moral reasoning level. This assumption
has not been consistently supported.
Clarifying that Kohlberg never clearly adhered to a simple stage model, in a twoyear longitudinal study, Walker and Taylor (1991) reported that individuals can
demonstrate moral reasoning representing two or more stage levels and that regression in
reasoning is possible. The study included child and adult subjects who were assessed as
reasoning within the first four stages of Kohlberg's level. Regression was seen during
each stage for both adults and children. The authors suggest the results support a
consolidation-transition model of moral reasoning, instead of a sequential cognitive
developmental model Wark and Krebs (2000) also found little within person
consistency in moral orientation (care versus justice). It appeared that moral reasoning
was based on moral schema activation. A consolidation-transition model posits that
development does not progress at a constant rate, but rather cycles through periods of
-consolidation of new information within a stage along with gradual transition to the next
stage as a result of cognitive disequilibrium. A consolidation-transition model is similar
to Kohlberg' s original thesis that cognitive disequilibrium promotes movement across
stages. The findings support a cyclical pattern of consolidation of new information
within stage and transition between stages being brought about over time by cognitive
disequilibrium.
The neo-Kohlbergian approach, introduced by Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau and Thoma
(1999) and Narvaez (2001) posits that moral development is based on how individuals
organize information within their moral schemas. A schema is a set of cognitive
principles or beliefs that the individual uses to organize, understand, and evaluate
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infonnation. An event or situation must elicit a moral schema for the individual to
recognize that a moral dilemma exists. The authors asserted that schemas develop from,
''preconventionality, conventionality, and postconventionality to depict a logical
sequence from simple to complex" (Narvaez, et al., 1999, p. 138). Preconventionality is
concerned with personal interest, conventionality is concerned with maintaining norms,
and postconventionality is concerned with creating norms and moral schemas that lead to
societal benefit and cooperation. Schemas develop and gradually change over time,
leading to increasingly advanced thinking skills. Schemas consist of implicit and tacit
knowledge used to interpret and judge dilemmas. Individuals with more advanced
schemas display higher moral sensitivity and moral reasoning (Rest et al, 1999).
In cross-sectional and longitudinal samples, Thoma and Rest (1999) found
individual and situational differences in utilization of cognitive skills associated with
moral stage development. That is, the cognitive skills believed to be associated with a
stage of moral development are not consistently applied in all situations. Similar to
Walker and Taylor (1991), Thoma and Rest found that individuals cycle through periods
of transition and consolidation, both within and across stages of moral reasoning. The
level of development of an individual's moral schema influences the processes of
consolidation and transition. Therefore, moral stage advancement does not occur in a
strict step-wise manner. During the consolidation phase (within stage), the individual is
most likely to consistently rely on the current stage or lower when engaging in moral
reasoning. Through the process of consolidation, the individual works toward becoming
proficient in using the moral reasoning skills associated with that stage. During the
transition phase (stage advancement), the individual is less likely to rely on one stage of
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moral reasoning, instead they employ a mixture of reasoning skills that they have already
attained as well as those they are attempting to incorporate at the next higher level of
cognitive reasoning. An individual most likely experiences confusion and uncertainty in
reasoning and actions during transition phases. During transition phases, consistency and
predictability of moral behavior decreases. Thus, the strength of the link between moral
reasoning and action varies with the process of consolidation and transition, being
stronger during times of consolidation and weaker during times of transition.
Thus, moral reasoning skills, which are determined by moral schemas, develop
through a process of consolidation and transition. Despite advancement to higher moral
schemas and reasoning skills, the schemas of less developed moral reasoning do remain
accessible, and may be activated or acted on in various situations. The ability of moral
reasoning to predict moral behavior is moderated by the phases of consolidation and
transition. This moderated effect is the strength in match between the activation of one's
moral schema levet as indicated by rankings of importance of decision making options,
and the ratings of importance of decision making options, which is measured by the
Utilizer or U score on the Defining Issues Test (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau and Thoma, 1999;
Thoma & Rest, 1999; Thoma, Rest, & Davison, 1991 ). During phases of consolidation a
moral schema develops and strengthens. During consolidation individuals adequately
understand and interpret new information that fits within the parameters of their current
moral schema. A transition phase occurs when a current moral schema is inadequate to
understand or interpret new information, leading to a feeling of conflict and
disequilibrium that encourages the individual to challenge and question their current
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moral schema, eventually leading to the development of a new and more advanced moral
schema.

Moral Reasoning and the Role ofEmotions
The moderating effect of the processes of transition and consolidation alone do
not adequately address prediction of moral behavior from moral reasoning. Alldredge,
Derryberry, Crowson, and Iran-Nejad (2000), Blasi (1980), Thoma (2000) and Pizarro's
(2000) reviews suggest that the psychological study of morality has historically been
divided into two perspectives. The traditional perspective encompasses the assumption
that moral reasoning alone is both necessary and adequate for the production of moral
behavior. More recently, psychological research has implied the importance of both
emotions and moral reasoning in the production of moral behavior, with an emphasis on
the role of empathy (Eisenberg, 2000; Hoffman, 2000; Lovell, 1999; Nunn & Hazier,
1990; Pizarro, 2000; Yardley, 1999).
In a critical review, Blasi (1980) summarized that moral reasoning is based on
cognitive factors while moral behavior is determined by social factors. While the overall
findings support the cognitive development perspective, he notes the limitations of
traditional cognitive developmental theory for focusing on moral reasoning while
ignoring the importance of moral values. He recommends a process approach such that,
in addition to cognition, one also incorporates identity, self-regulation, and self..
awareness as a means to increase the consistency between moral reasoning level and
moral behavior (Blasi, 1980, 1994).
Alldredge et al., (2000) propose a biofunctional model of moral development that
incorporates both implicit and explicit learning. Although these authors acknowledge
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that moral development is influenced by both internal and external information sources,
they posit that moral development occurs based on the brain's ability to adaptively
incorporate the information that led to cognitive disequilibrium. In this view, schema
development is seen as occurring at both the cognitive and biological level. Similarly,
Zigler (1999) advocates that moral reasoning and moral behavior need to be examined in
the context of emotions and the physiological patterns that accompany moral schema
development. This position is further expanded on by Damasio's (1994) findings that
decision making is enhanced when emotions are properly self-regulated. He
hypothesized that impairments in reasoning are due to a lack of emotional input and
awareness.
In the traditional cognitive developmental model of moral development, emotions
such as empathy, sympathy, guilt, or shame would not be necessary (or adequate) to
activate a moral schema. Pizarro (2000) questions and challenges the assumption of the
cognitive model of moral reasoning which states, "that emotions can never aid, and
always harm moral judgments," (p. 358). Similar to Damasio (1994), Pizarro posits that
emotions alert us to potential moral dilemmas and quickly and effectively focus our
attention and limited cognitive resources to aid in the decision making process. Thus, a
feedback loop exists between emotions and cognitions, allowing moral schemas to
incorporate congruent information, while incongruent information creates a sense of
disequilibrium that encourages moral reasoning advancement. Higher levels of moral
reasoning, especially at the postconventional level, require the ability to empathize with
others while putting the greater good of society ahead of individual needs. According to
Pizarro, the congruence between moral reasoning and moral behavior increases when
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emotions, specifically empathy, are taken into account, adding that empathy is a
motivator for pro-social behavior.
Hoffman (2000) agrees that traditional cognitive-developmental theory has
ignored affect. He emphasizes the role of empathy in the moral reasoning process, and
states that moral schemas are activated by empathy and thereby influence moral
reasoning. As he describes empathy as a prosocial motive, Hoffman sees empathy as a
positive contributor to moral reasoning. He does caution that empathic over-arousal may
increase one's level of personal distress to a point where an individual becomes unable or
unwilling to help others. However, failure to have an empathic response to a moral
dilemma will consistently result in failure to activate moral schema {Hoffman, 2000~
Pizarro, 2000).
In research studies, empathy has been defined as one's emotional or physical
arousal or distress to the distress expressed or experienced b another (Eisenberg, 2000;
Hoffman, 2000; Pizarro, 2000). That is, an empathic response is a response to the life
circumstances of another and not one's own circumstance. Empathic responses are
heightened in situations in which one believes that they are similar to the person
experiencing distress, attributes blame for the distress to a person other than the person
experiencing distress, and when one is able to perspective take and understand the
distress that another is experiencing (Pizarro, 2000). Recently, a distinction has been
made between an affective empathic response and a cognitive empathic response.
Affective empathy represents a vicarious response and emotional arousal to another's
distress, whereas cognitive empathy, which includes perspective taking, is the
understanding of another's distress (Brems, 1988; Davis, 1983; Davis & Oathout, 1987;
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Lovell, 1999; Morton, Worthley, Nitch, Lamberton, Loo & Testerman, 2000; Pizarro,
2000). The distinctions between cognitive and affective empathy, although difficult to
separate (Pizarro, 2000), may be useful in understanding why moral behavior does not
always follow from moral reasoning.
Eisenberg (2000), Hoffman (2000), Pizarro (2000), and Walker (2002) agree that
empathy is a catalyst to the moral reasoning process. Both affective and cognitive
empathic responses have the potential to alert one to the existence of a moral dilemma.
That is, an empathic response may activate ones' moral schema so that the moral
reasoning process is initiated. However, as cautioned by Eisenberg (2000), Hoffman
(2000) and Pizarro (2000) an inadequate empathic response (either over-arousal or underarousal) may hinder the moral reasoning process, thus stressing the importance of
effectively regulating our empathic response.
Thoma (2000) posits that the traditional theory of cognitive moral development is
singular and conceptually problematic, as moral reasoning alone is a poor predictor of
moral behavior. That is, other processes must act in conjunction with moral reasoning to
result in moral behavior. Using empirical findings, Thoma proposes that emotions,
situational characteristics and personality characteristics interact with cognitions to
determine moral action, and that consideration of each of these components is necessary
in any model of moral development that has as the ultimate goal predicting moral
behavior. Thoma cites Rest"s Four Component Model of Moral Behavior as
encompassing these facets that have been empirically linked to moral behavior, although
others have criticized both the neo-Kohlbergian approach and the Four Component model
for an explicit focus on cognition (Walker, 2002).

12
Rest's Four Component Model ofMoral Behavior

The process of consolidation and transition may be one of the reasons why low
correlations have been found between moral reasoning level and moral behavior.
Additionally, reliance on the traditional perspective of cognitive models of moral
development may also account for the incongruence between moral reasoning level and
moral behavior predictions. Rest (1994) noted that typically the study of morality has
been divided between the major schools of psychological theory, with behaviorists
studying behavior, cognitivists studying cognition and psychoanalysts studying affect and
personality. Rest hypothesizes that by not considering each of these facets
simultaneously researchers cannot accurately examine morality. In response, Rest (1994)
proposed an interactive Four Component Model of Moral Behavior. The components
are: (1) Moral Sensitivity- awareness of the situation as involving a moral dilemma,
perspective taking and awareness of cause and effect outcomes for all involved; (2)
Moral Reasoning- judging which action is most moral or right~ (3) Moral Motivation -

commitment to prioritizing moral values and moral action above other values; and (4)
Moral Character - ego strength and moral commitment that allow persistence in moral

action. Although Rest refers to his model as non-sequential and interactive, without
moral sensitivity, that is, without awareness that a moral dilemma exists, one does not
need to engage in a moral reasoning process. Rest describes the interaction of these four
components as the determinants of moral behavior. This model incorporates cognitive,
affective and personality skill development that lead to moral behavior choices. As Rest
( 1994) hypothesizes, adequacy in each of these four components is necessary for moral
behavior, while a deficit in any one component may result in immoral behavior. Rest

13

(1984), Rest (1994), Rest and Narvaez (1994), and Rest et al., (1999) agree that the four
components are not sequential, but are interactive involving feed-forward and feed-back
loops; however, moral sensitivity appears to start the decision-making process (see Figure
1). Rest has recommended studying facets that make up each of the components in
isolation in an effort to investigate the patterns of how the four components relate to each
other and to other variables. In the present study facets believed to be part of the make·
up of the components of moral sensitivity and moral reasoning will be examined.
Specifically, this study will examine the empathy facet, including both affective and
cognitive empathy, of the moral sensitivity component and the moral reasoning
development of the moral reasoning component. The components of moral motivation
and moral character will not be directly investigated in this study.

Figure 1. Rest's Four Component Model of Moral Behavior.

Once a moral schema is activated, the feed-forward and feed-back loops during a
given situation are analogous to the process of consolidation and transition in moral stage
development and stage advancement. The assumption of the four-component model is
that these four inner psychological processes facilitate observable moral behavior (Rest et
al, 1999). However, the present study posits that moral sensitivity is a catalyst to the
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decision-making process, as depicted in Figure 1. Moral sensitivity, awareness of a
moral dilemma, which requires the activation of a moral schema, is a likely prerequisite
to the process of moral deliberation. Without this awareness, moral reasoning does not
follow and there is no reason for an individual to consider their moral values or priorities.
Thus, moral sensitivity is a necessary but insufficient component for moral reasoning,
and moral reasoning is necessary but not sufficient for moral behavior. Research
continues to support a consolidation and transition/interactional model that includes
Rest's Four Components of Moral Behavior (McNeel, 1994; Pizarro, 2000; Pratt et al,
1996; Rest, 1994; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau & Thoma, 1999; Thoma, 2000; Thoma & Rest,
1999; Wark & Krebs, 1996). Rest acknowledges that most research on moral
development has focused on his second component, moral reasoning. Overall, there is
minimal research on the other three components. In a review of professional education
and the Four Component Model of Moral Behavior, Bebeau (2002) notes that the effect
of moral climate and professional development on moral reasoning have not been
adequately studied.
Bebeau, Rest and Yamoor (1985) and Bebeau (1994), in assessing Rest's Four
Component Model of Moral Behavior in dental students, found that ethical sensitivity is a
distinct construct from moral reasoning. Assessment of three of the four components
(moral sensitivity using the Dental Ethical Sensitivity Test, moral reasoning using the
Defining Issues Test, and moral motivation using an assessment of an essay on "What it
means to you to become a professional") indicate that competency in one component
does not predict competency in the other components. These results may possibly be due
to the interactive nature of the components such that development within any one
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component will directly influence the level and quality of moral reasoning. The level of
development of the moral schema and where the individual is in the phases of
consolidation and transition influence individuals' confidence in recognizing and making
moral judgments, but in real-life ambiguous situations, emotions and values interact with
these cognitive processes to produce moral actions. It does seem that there is support for
the components of Rest's model, and that moral behavior is a result of the complex
interaction of these four components.
The association between moral reasoning and moral behavior is in the 10% to
15% range (Thoma, 1994), supporting the view that moral reasoning skill level is not

necessarily congruent with real-life moral decision making. Thoma suggests that moral
reasoning may play a lesser role in moral behaviors than was previously thought. That is,
like moral sensitivity, moral reasoning is also necessary but not sufficient for moral
behavior. Thoma, Rest and Davison ( 1991) demonstrate that the strength of association
between moral reasoning and moral behavior is moderated by the match between one's
ratings issues to consider when making a moral decision and their rankings of the four
most important issues to consider in moral decision making.
Recent research has implicated the importance of considering both cognitive
processes and emotion and effective emotional regulation in the initiation of the moral
reasoning process (Alldredge et al, 2000; Blasi, 1980, 1994; Thoma, 2000; Pizarro, 2000;
Walker, 2002). Specifically, Damasio (1994) and Pizarro (2000) state that self. .emotional
awareness alerts one to the existence of a potential moral dilemma. That is, emotional
awareness triggers the moral sensitivity component, and if this activation is strong
enough one's moral schema is activated to cue the moral reasoning process.
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Postconventional reasoning skills requires that one is able to empathize with the distress
that another may be experiencing while being able to prioritize societal values and
cooperation above the individual's or one's own personal needs.
We believe that moral sensitivity is a precursor to the moral reasoning process.
One facet of activating the moral sensitivity component is through emotional awareness
and perspective taking, specifically empathy. Eisenberg (2000) Hoffman (2000) and
Pizarro (2000) each emphasize the role of empathy in alerting one to the presence of a
moral dilemma, in activating moral schemas and as a catalyst to moral reasoning. An
empathic response induces awareness of the situation as involving a moral dilemma,
incorporates the ability to perspective take, and activates moral schemas, all of which fall
into the component of moral sensitivity.
Empathy is believed to be made up of two components: an affective response to
another's distress and a cognitive response in the ability to understand another distress
through perspective taking (Brems, 1988; Davis, 1983; Davis & Oathout, 1987; Lovell,
1999; Morton, et al., 2000; Pizarro, 2000). In essence, when an affective empathy
response occurs one is essentially feeling what the person in distress is feeling, while in a
cognitive empathic response one perceives their level of control in managing the distress
experienced by another. One's personal reaction to empathy may also influence whether
or not a moral schema is activated, additionally a dispositional tendency to be empathic
versus situationally induced empathic responses may lead to differences in moral schema
activation. Over or under-arousal of an empathic response may interfere with the
activation of the moral schema and subsequent moral reasoning and action choice
(Eisenberg, 2000; Hoffman, 2000; Pizarro, 2000 ). If one is too empathic, that is in
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situations of another's personal distress one assumes the emotions that another is
experiencing leading to inappropriate emotional arousal in oneself; this purely affective
response may increase one's own distress level and interfere with their ability to
effectively engage in the moral reasoning process. Additionally, if one is aware that they
have a tendency to become over-aroused when others are experiencing personal distress,
they may work to suppress such a response in an attempt to deal with the situation on a
purely cognitive level. That is, they will prevent themselves from having an affective
response, which in turn, may prevent the activation of one's moral schema and the moral
reasoning process. As a cognitive empathic response also encompasses the individual's
level of control in managing the distress experienced by another, if the individual
perceives that they are vulnerable or at risk not to effectively manage the situation, moral
schema activation may not occur and the moral reasoning process will not be iriitiated.
Davis (1980, 1983) found support to a multidimensional assessment of empathy that
incorporates both affective and cognitive aspects of empathy. Despite research findings
that empathy, specifically affective empathy, is correlated with moral reasoning,
Eisenberg (2000) reported that perspective taking (cognitive empathy) is negatively
related to or unrelated to pro-social behavior. This finding stresses the importance of
examining both affective and cognitive aspects of empathy and how they may
differentially impact moral reasoning, and to investigate other variables for potential
mediator or moderator effects.
The present study, as a facet of moral sensitivity's activation of moral schema and
the moral reasoning process, will examine the processes of an affective empathy response
and a cognitive empathy response. An affective empathy response consists of one's own
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awareness of an empathic response and arousal in themselves in response to external
triggers or the personal distress of another. An affective empathy response, with
effective emotional regulation is believed to be necessary to activate moral schemas and
cue the moral reasoning process. A cognitive empathy response is not awareness of
one's own emotional response but an understanding of the personal distress another is
experiencing through perspective taking. Cognitive empathy, awareness of distress in
another without experiencing such distress oneself, response may not be sufficient to cue
the moral reasoning process. Training in the helping professions encourages students to
understand and empathize with clients' distress in a cognitive empathic manner, while
discouraging an affective empathy response. That is, the therapist is to gain an
understanding of the client's distress while understanding that any responses they
experience are due to the clients' distress and not their own personal circumstances. The
present study will investigate if these two different empathic response styles, as facets of
moral sensitivity, have a different impact on moral reasoning. Moral climate will also be
investigated to determine whether it may mediate or moderate the relationship between
the empathy styles and moral reasoning. The potential to perceive a lack of control in
understanding or managing the distress experienced by another, or the concern that one
may have to engage in risk-taking in order to understand or manage the distress
experienced by another, in a cognitive empathic response may indicate that cognitive
empathy is mediated by moral climate.
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Psychology and Professional Ethics
To be licensed as a psychologist, to be a member of APA or to conduct research
with humans or animals trainees, interns, researchers and licensed psychologists agree to
abide by the APA Ethics Code. Knowledge of ethical standards and practice is required
on licensing exams, continuing education credit in ethics is necessary for licensure
renewal, and since 1979, APA has required ethics training in its accredited psychology
programs (Welfel, 1992). Ethics courses, research and clinical supervision, and role
modeling have been the primary modes for students to learn about ethical practices.
Ethics codes in many professions, including psychology, were originally developed so
that a profession could police itself; however, as society becomes more litigious,
professional ethics codes are considered legal standards (Bebeau, 1994; Kitchener, 1999;
Koocher, 1994; Koocher & Keith-Spiegel, 1998; Williams, 2001), and the APA ethics
code states that if the, "ethics code establishes a higher standard of conduct than is
required by law, psychologists must meet the higher ethical standard. If the
psychologists' ethical responsibilities conflict with law, regulations~ or other governing
legal authority, psychologists make known their commitment to the ethics code and take
steps to resolve the conflict in a responsible manner" (APA Ethics Committee, 2002, p.
1062).
Holmes (1996) and Prilleltensky (1989) assert that psychology has not examined
its values as a discipline, and that psychologists have not been actively encouraged to
examine their personal morals. Instead, they are encouraged to view psychology as valueneutral. Principled ethics, such as those outlined in the AP A Code of Ethics are too broad
to define what it means to be ethical or moral when providing psychological services in
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psychotherapeutic settings (Jordan & Meara, 1990). Principled ethics focus on the use of
objective and universal decision making skills, whereas in real-life decision-making,
variables such as character, personal investment, personal values, stress, lack of
experience, anxiety, financial need and rationalization all impact on the decision-making
process (Holmes, 1996; Jordan et al, 1990; Kitchener, 1999; Koocher & Keith-Spiegel,
1998; Prilleltensky, 1997; Smith, McGuire, Abbott, & Blau, 1991). The nine core ethical
principles guiding psychologists; nonmaleficence, respecting autonomy, beneficence,
being just, being faithful, according dignity, care and compassion, pursuit of excellence
and accountability (APA Ethics Committee, 1992 & 2002; Kitchener, 1999; Koocher et
al, 1998) may not be "practiced unless they are already embedded in the fabric of
psychologists' characters" (Koocher et al, 1998, p. 5). That is, knowledge of ethical
principles alone is not sufficient; the principles need to be incorporated into one's identity
so that facing a moral dilemma activates a moral schema to initiate a moral reasoning
process.
Smith, McGuire, Abbott and Blau (1991) assessed clinicians' reasoning to resolve
ethical dilemmas. A discrepancy was found between what clinicians should do and what
they would do. In terms of Rest's Four Component Model of Moral Behavior, awareness
of the ethics code and what should be done corresponds with the components of moral
sensitivity and moral reasoning, while the components of moral motivation and moral
character correspond with reports of what one would actually do. Discrepancies between
the action dictated by the ethics code and what a clinician reports they actually would do,
did not hold when the situation was one that explicitly and clearly violated the ethics
code. In cases of clear ethical violations, clinicians' assessments of what they should do
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and what they would do were consistent. Similar to Koocher (1998), Smith et al., (1991)
suggests that the discrepancy between what one should do and what one would do results
from deficits in integrity and honesty, such discrepancies may indicate that the ethics
code has not been internalized into one's identity or moral schema. Possible alternative
explanations for these discrepancies may be that the clinician is experiencing a conflict
between two or more values espoused by the ethics code, or is experiencing personal
distress or emotional turmoil which could interfere with decisions about what they would
do, especially if choices are subtle.
Sonne ( 1994) suggests that the ambiguity of the APA Ethics Code does not
provide clear guidelines in ethical decision making, in gray areas like non-sexual multiple
relationships, and does not emphasize the importance of moral sensitivity to initiate the
moral reasoning process. Thus, when the core ethical principles are in conflict with one
another (i.e.; in situations where one must weigh the care provided to a client against the
clients' right to autonomy to refuse treatment or in favor of the treatment of their choice),
the APA Ethics Code does not provide guidelines regarding which principle supercedes
the others '(Kitchener, 1999; Koocher et al, 1998). Without clear guidelines of what
constitutes reasonable behavior, Sonne suggests that moral insensitivity may be
evidenced in day-to-day decision making. Ethics education assumes that students have
already established more advanced moral values and beliefs though this is not necessarily
true and is likely a poor assumption behind the education process (Brockett, Geddes,
Westmorland, & Salvatori, 1997). Numerous authors (APA Ethics Code, 1992 & 2002;
Holmes, 1996; Jordan et al., 1990; Kitchener, 1999; Koocher & Keith-Spiegel, 1998;
Prilleltensky, 1989 & 1997; Smith et al., 1991; Sonne, 1994; and Welfel, 1992)
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recommend psychologists become aware of their own value systems and how these
systems impact day-to-day decision making. Thus, knowledge of an ethics code alone
may not adequately develop or activate the moral schema necessary for moral decisionmaking. Through experiences in clinical supervision, students can be encouraged to
become aware of their own values and moral schemas and how these impact their day-today decision making in therapeutic settings.
Moral Climate;· Psychology Students and the Role o/Clinical Supervision

In a review of 172 articles, King and Mayhew (2002) found that improvements in
moral reasoning are associated with higher education in undergraduates, even after
controlling for the effects of age and entering level of moral reasoning. McNeel (1994)
reports that in longitudinal and cross-sectional samples of students that the "college
experience ejfecf' (p. 31) accounts for increases in moral reasoning on the Defining

Issues Test (DIT) with effect sizes of .92 and .93 respectively. These effect sizes were
calculated by dividing the change between freshman and senior year by the freshman
standard deviation. Effect sizes of this magnitude are considered large. Additionally,
McNeel (1994) reports that for psychology students, the magnitude of change for growth
of principled reasoning was d = 1.48. Magnitude of change for other subject majors
were, "nursing (1.47), with English (1.26), all others (1.15), and social work (1.01 )"
(McNeel, 1994, p. 34). These change scores for each discipline, including psychology,
are statistically significant. Change was attributed to peer and faculty discussions of
moral dilemmas, indicating that exposure to the higher moral levels of others fosters
personal moral development. However, it is unclear if the assessed change represents
true moral growth that translates into behavior or if the growth reflects tacit knowledge of

23
moral theory without corresponding action change. That is, students may perform better
on the DIT over time due to exposure to moral theory in the classroom environment; this
does not necessarily imply behavioral change. However, there has been no evidence that
students can fake-good; in fact, exposure to moral theory may create the disequilibrium
necessary for the student to enter the transition phase, which eventually leads to stage
advancement. McNeel (1994) concludes that moral reasoning development is improved
by, "dilemma discussion, deliberate psychological education'' (p. 43) and a direct skill
building approach, including skills of principled reasoning, such as, "skills of logic, role
taking and justice operations" (McNeel, 1994, p. 41). McNeel found that in a three-anda-half month course on principled reasoning, the growth effect size on the DIT was d =
.65, which falls in the moderate range, although rates of growth were not similar for all
students. Similar to McNeel's (1994) findings on improving principled reasoning in
students, Bebeau ( 1994) indicates that role-taking and experiential learning improves
levels of moral sensitivity in dental students. Therefore, moving beyond didacticteaching methods alone may increase the likelihood of activation of moral sensitivity and
moral schemas in morally ambiguous situations, which are necessary for moral behavior
to result. However, for a schema to develop and change, the individual must be faced
with information that is incongruent with or in conflict with their current moral schema
(Rest et al, 1999 ), and encouraged and supported in their efforts to reason through this
conflict. Such encouragement and support is offered in a supportive clinical supervision
experience in which the student works through day-to-day dilemmas they personally
encounter.
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The principles and standards outlined in the APA Ethics Code assume that
psychologists operate at a postconventional (creating norms) level of moral reasoning.
One way for individuals to advance to the postconventional level of moral reasoning is
through exposure to dilemmas, such as those encountered during clinical supervision
experiences. Moral sensitivity and moral reasoning leading to moral behavior may
reflect the individual's moral schema at the time the decision is made, and not of ethical
principles per se unless those principles have been incorporated into one's identity and
moral schema. It is imperative that moral schema development be internalized into one's
identity (Thoma & Rest, 1999; Walker & Taylor, 1991), and one method for this to come
about is through clinical supervision in which the student is provided with a safe
environment in which to openly discuss and raise any concerns they may be
experiencing, while also being appropriately made aware of any potential dilemmas that
they were not initially aware of.
Sprinthall (1994) states that discussion alone may not foster moral development,
and advocates role-taking as a method to foster moral development by advancing both
cognitive reasoning skills (moral schema) and empathic (moral sensitivity) development.
Thus, Sprinthall agrees that moral behavior is not solely based on moral reasoning. He
proposes role-taking as a method to address each of Rest's four components, believing
that actively using and practicing moral sensitivity and moral reasoning skills leads to
moral behavior. Experiential learning and role-taking, opportunities provided in clinical
supervision, move beyond the reasoning and motivational components by having students
actively resolve real-life dilemmas by evoking emotional reactions and awareness of the
possible moral choices (activating moral sensitivity). To adequately investigate the
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relationship of moral reasoning and moral behavior, which historically have been poorly
correlated, attention must be given to components beyond moral reasoning alone.
Assessment of moral reasoning alone ignores the influence of personal and contextual
variables, including affect, past experiences, awareness of consequences, perceptions of
risks, personal investment, and personality traits which are incorporated in the other
components of Rest's model.
Professions, such as psychology, continue to rely on ethics courses to instill moral
values and behaviors, despite findings indicating that traditional didactic ethics classes do
not lead to moral development (Rest & Narvaez, 1994). For example, Kalichman (1990)
found that despite awareness of mandatory reporting, 21 % of psychologists refuse to
report child abuse, a situation that most individuals clearly recognize as unethical. Many
academic ethics courses continue to focus on "intermediate-level concepts (e.g., notions
such as informed consent, paternalistic deceptions and privileged confidentiality)" (Rest

& Narvaez, 1994, p. 221 ). Ethical violations by psychology graduate students who
previously completed an ethics course included violation of professional boundaries,
sexual and non-sexual misconduct (20% ), plagiarism or data falsification ( 15%), breach
of confidentiality ( 10%), endangering the welfare of the client ( 10%), failure to comply
with policy (10%), lack of competency (9%), dishonesty (8%), and misrepresentation of
credentials (3%) (Fly, van Bark, Weinman, Kitchener, & Lang, 1997). Ethical violations
may be the consequence of lack of moral sensitivity to potential ethical dilemmas, despite
concrete knowledge of a code of ethics.
Betan and Stanton (1999) report that many psychologists were not initially aware
of an ethical dilemma when presented in either written or videotaped format. Similar
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results were found among dental students prior to dental ethical sensitivity training
(Bebeau, 1994). In a review of ethics education, Welfel (1992) summarized that the
effectiveness of ethics training in psychology students has not been adequately assessed.
She found a number of psychology interns did not recognize the presence of an ethical
dilemma unless prompted to look for one. Additionally, a number of psychology
students indicate they would not act on their ethical decision indicating that adequate
moral sensitivity and moral reasoning were not sufficient to result in moral behavior.
The components of moral sensitivity and moral reasoning were found to be
distinct constructs among dental students (Bebeau, Rest, & Yamoor, 1985). In a crosssectional design, junior students scored higher on moral sensitivity than freshmen
students indicating that moral sensitivity improves with education, age, and/or
experience. In addition, differences in correlations between moral sensitivity and moral
reasoning were found by year of training. In freshmen, moral sensitivity and moral
reasoning were significantly correlated (r = .51 ), while for juniors this correlation drops
to statistical insignificance (r = .24 ). These findings reveal that age and educational
experience alone are not sufficient for a positive linear relationship between moral
sensitivity and moral reasoning. Additionally, these findings indicate that the possibility
that the two components may not develop at the same rate, and that the discrepancy
between moral sensitivity and moral reasoning may increase with age and education. The
authors conclude that this provides support for the distinctiveness of the two components
of moral sensitivity and moral reasoning (Bebeau & Brabeck, 1989; Bebeau et al, 1985;
Bebeau et al, 1999). Instead of expecting a linear relationship between the two
components, the processes of consolidation (changes within stage) and transition
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(changes across stages) may better explain these findings. An alternative explanation
may be that one or more variables may be mediating or moderating the relationship
between moral sensitivity and moral reasoning. In familiar situations, year of schooling
accounted for 40% of the variance in moral reasoning, which requires the activation of
moral sensitivity, while in unfamiliar situations year of schooling accounted for only 5%
of the variance in moral reasoning, indicating that moral sensitivity was not activated
(Bebeau & Thoma, 1999). Despite moral sensitivity being heightened in familiar
situations, moral schema advancement and generalization to unfamiliar and morally
ambiguous situations did not occur.
Although ethics education is common to many counseling professions, training in
research and scientific methods separates psychologists from many other counseling
professions (Ellis, 1992), and this training is conducted via an apprenticeship model. A
student-mentor relationship can foster ethical learning and behavior. As noted by Welfel
and Kitchener (1992) there continues to be a focus on principled ethical training
conducted in a classroom setting, rather than a focus on the ethics or moral issues that
students encounter on a day-to-day basis in their professional training which can be
addressed in a supervision or mentor relationship. Vitz (1990) views a moral response as
more than just moral reasoning; a moral response is rooted in personal and social
demands. Vitz also emphasizes that moral reasoning includes an affective component
that is influenced by personal and contextual demands. As pointed out by Smith et al.
( 1991 ), focusing ethical training solely on situations in which ethical guidelines have
clearly been violated is only the starting point. The ultimate goal is to improve moral
sensitivity in situations that are morally ambiguous. That is, one goal of ethics training
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and clinical supervision is to develop adequate moral schemas so that in a morally
ambiguous situation schema activation (moral sensitivity- awareness that a moral
dilemma exists) will initiate the moral reasoning process and lead to moral behavior. As
Sonne (1994) and Smith et al. (1991) note, it is the morally ambiguous, day-to-day
situations faced by clinicians in which the failure to activate a moral schema results in a
failure to act morally. It is in such situations that the role of the clinical supervisor and
mentor is of utmost importance, as supervision affords the opportunity to address the dayto-day situations and dilemmas faced by students as they arise.
The quality of the supervision experience and the students' perceptions of the
clinical supervision experience directly impact the student-mentor relationship. An open
and supportive relationship will foster developments in moral sensitivity, moral schema
and moral reasoning. In such a relationship, the student will be aware of their role and
the role of the supervisor, have clear expectations regarding the goals of the supervision
experience, and will be comfortable in raising any concerns or issues that they may
encounter or be experiencing. If the student and the supervisor have clear roles and
expectations these delicate and personal interactions can set the stage for open and honest
discuss of any explicit and/or subtle dilemma or conflict encountered on a day-to-day
basis by the student. Conversely, closed, authoritarian or hostile supervision
environments may hamper development of moral sensitivity, moral schema and moral
reasoning. Bebeau (2002) notes that a moral climate that incorporates a 'hidden
curriculum,' in which academic and supervision environments do not make known how
students will be evaluated, what the expectations of students are, and open disagreement
is discouraged, hampers moral development in professional educational settings. In

29
closed supervision environments, students experience confusion regarding their role and
the role of their supervisor, expectations and evaluations are not clearly outlined, and the
student may feel that they are in a position in which they have to agree with their
supervisor and that they are not permitted to raise any questions or concerns. In such
environments, students would not be offered the opportunity to discuss moral dilemmas
or any issues or concerns that they may be experiencing for fear of disagreeing with their
supervisor or appearing incompetent. Bebeau's (2002) review found that professional
education alone did not improve moral reasoning unless it also included the opportunity
for students to openly discuss ethical and moral dilemmas. The student's perception of
the moral climate provided during their academic and clinical supervision training
impacts both their development of moral sensitivity and moral reasoning. Through open
and supportive academic and supervision experiences students learn the skills necessary
to become aware of their own values, create norms, and implement moral behavior.
In contrast to other professional disciplines, including dentistry, nursing, teaching,
veterinary, medicine, accounting, and journalism (Rest & Narvaez, 1994), psychology
has not studied of the impact of ethics training and the moral climate within its own
discipline. Despite the belief that psychologists should act ethically and morally, Welfel
(1992) found few empirical investigations concerning the impact of ethics training, and
concluded the available research is inconclusive regarding the influence of ethics training
on ethical behavior in psychology students. Ethics training in psychology has focused on
the technical aspects of ethics at the expense of moral sensitivity. That is, students are
taught to be sensitive to explicit ethical violations, the intermediate-level concepts of
consent, deception and confidentiality as identified by Rest and Narvaez ( 1994 ). Though
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it is in .implicit or unfamiliar situations that the risk of immoral or unethical behavior
increases, students are not encouraged to be sensitive to implicit moral dilemmas; the
day-to-day issues encountered that are not explicitly addressed by the ethics code
(Welfel, 1992). It is in such morally ambiguous situations that the function of the
student-mentor role may be most important. A student-mentor relationship allows for
discussion of moral issues to be considered within the context and development of the
student's life (Ruiz & Vallejos, 1999). Direct supervision may facilitate moral schema
development so that training includes interpreting the ethics code using postconventional
reasoning skills, including abstract thinking that is required to meet the goal of societal
cooperation (Holmes, 1996), thereby increasing the chances of ethical and moral action, .
even in morally ambiguous situations. Supervision, role-taking and experiential learning
may foster the internalization of ethical values through the process of consolidation to
facilitate postconventional reasoning. Direct student-mentor relationships allow students
to challenge their current moral schema, foster more advanced moral schemas, while
developing the confidence and emotional regulation skills necessary in effective moral
reasoning (Saami, 1999). Specifically, appropriate management of emotions aids in
decision making, while attempting to ignore emotions hinders the decision making
process. In order for these goals of supervision to be met, the student-mentor
environment must be open. If a student feels vulnerable with their supervisor and are
uncomfortable stating that they are experiencing distress (i.e.; the 'hidden curriculum'),
the supervision experience will not meet these goals as the student will not feel safe in
opening such discussion. ·In such closed environments, the student may attempt to
suppress any emotional responses they have to moral dilemmas they encounter out of fear

31
of being evaluated negatively by their supervisor. This suppression will eliminate the
opportunity for discussion, and awareness of potential moral dilemmas may diminish in
an attempt to over self-regulate. If the student feels safe and supported, they will not
experience a sense of vulnerability with their supervisor and will be confident that their
supervisor is available to assist them with any issues or concerns that they raise. Such
open and free discussion will foster both the student's awareness of potential moral
dilemmas, while the student learns to effectively regulate both affective and cognitive
empathic responses to moral dilemmas.
Plante ( 1995) found that despite psychology students' awareness of the APA
Ethics Code, they have little experience applying ethical standards. He suggests that
academic and clinical training cannot possibly cover all potential dilemmas a student may
face, and instead chooses to focus on principled ethics. Welfel (1992) reports that in a
sample of graduate psychology students and licensed psychologists, over half did not
recognize an ethical dilemma presented in a video tape of a therapist-client interaction,
and even after prompting, one quarter failed to recognize an ethical dilemma.
Interactions depicted included situations involving duty to warn and possible sexual
abuse of a minor, indicating that subject's moral schemas and moral sensitivity were not
adequately developed to be sensitive to these ethical areas. The failure to activate moral
sensitivity, specifically feelings of empathy toward the potential victims, interfered with
the moral reasoning process. In discussion of moral sensitivity, Betan and Stanton (1999)
include awareness of one's emotions in applying ethics, and add that acting ethically does
not always feel good. For example, psychology students are less likely to act ethically in
situations in which they feel anxiety; a situation in which an open supervision
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environment may directly assist the student to effective regulate their emotional reaction
in order to initiate the moral reasoning process. Betan and Stanton ( 1999) suggest that
psychologists are ~t risk to inadequately engage in moral reasoning due to a lack of
awareness of the role of personal values, affect and contextual demands, such as personal
investment, awareness of consequences, risk of consequences, etc. Emotional arousal in
an ethical situation influences the moral reasoning process. If appropriately managed,
emotions aid in decision making (Damasio, 1994; Pizarro, 2000; Saami,

1999)~

however,

if not appropriately acknowledged or regulated, emotional arousal may lead to avoidance
of the moral reasoning process (Betan & Staton, 1999). Betan and Staton (1999) suggest
that professional development and clinical supervision experiences need to assist students
in learning to tolerate uncomfortable emotions and to self-regulate emotions, including
empathy, personal distress and conflict, and ambiguity in decision making. Additionally,
Holmes (1996) advocates that supervision openly address issues of emotional
countertransference, in that supervision experiences need to provide a safe and supportive
forum in which students can discuss their emotional responses to clients, co-workers and
the clinical environment. Effective supervision can not operate in a vacuum and ignore
the emotional responses of students. Instead, supervision may be a rich opportunity for
students to address both their cognitive and affective responses with the aim of engaging
in moral reasoning and moral action that benefits and not harm the client.
Housman and Stake (1999) found that despite specific training in sexual ethics
there was still a knowledge deficit among psychology doctoral students, reporting that
50% of the students in their sample report having been attracted to a client. Yet, many
students were unaware that attraction to a client may be frequently experienced, and
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although attraction itself is not unethical, the students seemed unaware of the impact such
emotions on their decision making. The authors stress the importance of supervision,
discussion and experiential learning in resolving moral dilemmas; however, they indicate
that many supervision environments are not supportive of a student addressing such
emotions as attraction to a client. That is, students may not be actively encouraged to
openly address issues of emotional transference, especially if they perceive that they will
be negatively evaluated for such or are fearful (i.e., the 'hidden curriculum') that in
raising such concerns they will be seen as incompetent or unprofessional. Such a closed
environment does not foster moral sensitivity. Without an open supervision environment,
the student will not move beyond interpreting the ethics code at a conventional level.
Therefore, such an environment does not foster consolidation of ethical beliefs into one's
identity, as one does not become confident and comfortable in adequately addressing or
resolving ethical and moral dilemmas and the associated emotions. Without
encouragement to seek supervision when feeling negative emotions or anxiety, the risk of
unethical behavior is increased and internalization of an effective moral schema is
hampered. With the elimination of the oral examination for licensure in the state of
California, the role of supervision in adequately and openly addressing values and beliefs
cannot be over-emphasized. Lambert and Ogles (1997) suggest that, in addition to
development of therapeutic techniques, effective supervision includes assisting trainee's
to become aware of their values and morals while fostering personal growth, to develop
moral schemas, emotional self-regulation and abstract reasoning skills. Additionally,
clinical supervision includes assisting students to increase their moral sensitivity to
potential ethical and moral dilemmas. Supervision may assist students in learning about
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and effectively coping with their own emotional reactions to the distress a client may be
experiencing. Specifically, students need to become aware of both affective empathic
and cognitive empathic responses and how these may each cue the moral reasoning
process.

Present Study
Professionally and in student training, moral behavior appears to consist of an
interaction of professional education experiences and perceptions of the moral climate,
and moral sensitivity to potential moral dilemmas including empathy, perspective taking
and the ability emotionally self-regulate (Blasi, 1980; 1994; Brockett, et al., 1997;
Holmes, 1996; Koocher, 1998; Leonard, 1997; Rest & Narvaez, 1994, Ruiz & Vallejos,
1999; Zilger, 1999). Through ethical identity development, emotional self-regulation,
clinical supervision, mentoring, and experiential role-taking, the likelihood of effective
moral reasoning and moral behavior improve the consolidation of moral values into one's
identity. Without moral sensitivity, moral schemas fail to be activated and the moral
reasoning process is not initiated. Moral sensitivity is not guaranteed by classroom ethics
training alone. In fact, moral sensitivity may be enhanced or diminished as a result of the
training environment (Bebeau, 2002; Jaeger, 2001 ). Development of moral sensitivity
requires experiential learning in real day-to-day situations in an environment that is
supportive and open to promote consolidation of moral values. Additionally,
interpretation and understanding of an ethics code at a conventional level (maintaining
norms, rule-based) will not adequately prepare psychology students for the implicit
decision-making they will experience in a therapeutic setting. Consistent moral action is
likely to result when an ethics code is interpreted and understood at a postconventional
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level (creating norms with the goal of societal cooperation) and when such ideals have
been consolidated, through the development of moral schemas. Research into how the
students' perceptions of their academic and supervision experiences impact moral
sensitivity and moral reasoning skills will provide information to tailor educational and
professional development experiences to foster moral schema development.
The public and professional associations expect psychology students and
psychologists to act in an ethical and moral manner. The levels of trust and intimacy
achieved in a therapeutic environment place a client at potential risk if the therapist acts
in an unethical or immoral manner. Historically, moral development and ethics training
have employed discussion of ethical dilemmas as a method to foster moral growth (Rest

& Narvaez, 1994). Although Kohlberg was influential in getting people to look
internally for moral development, recent research indicates that moral development is
based on a combination of age (specifically for stages one through four) and experience
(specifically for advancement to stages five and six) (Rest, Thoma & Edwards, 1997).
However, for Koocher (1998) an underlying assumption of the ethics code is that
psychology students and psychologists have already incorporated the ethical principles
espoused by the code into their personalities.
The majority of research in moral development has focused on the moral
reasoning component of Rest's Four Component Model of Moral Behavior (Rest, 1994;
Rest & Narvaez, 1994; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999). These authors advocate
that moral development improves with an increase in thinking skills. Typically,
behaviors, cognitions and affect have been studied in isolation. Assessing only one
component of morality does not provide a complete reflection of the skills an individual
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incorporates when encountering a moral dilemma. Additionally, assessment of only one
component may underestimate the intent of moral behavior if an individual is in the
process of transition; whereas if the individual is in a process of consolidation the
association with intent of moral behavior may be strengthened (Thoma et al, 1991;
Thoma & Rest, 1999; Walker & Taylor, 1991). At an educational level, ethics training
initially targets the components of moral sensitivity and moral reasoning. Yet, moral
sensitivity and moral reasoning are each necessary but not sufficient for moral behavior
to occur. However, the adequate development of the component of moral sensitivity and
activation of one's moral schema is necessary to start the moral reasoning process. Moral
development research has examined moral reasoning in physicians, dentists, nurses, and
veterinarians (Rest & Narvaez, 1994); however, there is little research on moral reasoning
in providers of psychological services. Bebeau (2002) found that research has not
adequately examined the influence of the moral climate provided in professional
development experiences on moral reasoning.
Development of moral sensitivity, and thus moral reasoning, may be either
fostered or hindered by the moral climate the student is exposed to during their
professional training and development. There are no known empirical studies
investigating graduate psychology students' perceptions of their moral climate, and how
their moral climate influences the relationship between moral sensitivity and moral
reasoning. The present study will examine these relationships (see Figure 2a and Figure
2b). The present study posits that the constructs of moral sensitivity and moral reasoning
are positively related and that moral sensitivity initiates the moral reasoning process.
Although these constructs are positively correlated, these correlations are typically small
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indicating that there are potentially other variables that either mediate or moderate this
relationship. Rest and others have stated that to adequately define and measure all four
components is a formidable task, and recommend isolating facets of the components, and
that over time a body of empirical research will reveal insights into the patterns of
relationships of the four components with each other and with other variables. A
criticism of the Four Component Model of Moral Behavior has been that despite
asserting that each component is made up of both cognitive and affective factors, research
has focused on the cognitive aspects (Walker, 2002). This deficit will be addressed in the
present study, in that affective and cognitive processes are included in the component of
moral sensitivity, which Walker (2002) states is essential in the assessment of this
component. Moral sensitivity, including an empathic response to a moral dilemma, may
activate a moral schema to cue the moral reasoning process. Specifically, the present
study will look at both affective (awareness of emotional arousal) and cognitive
(perspective-taking, that another person is experiencing distress) facets of empathy and
their relationship to moral reasoning. Additionally, how one learns to become aware of
and regulate their empathic responses and their ability to perspective take in moral
dilemmas encountered in therapeutic settings is influenced by the quality and perception
of their academic and clinical supervision experience. In supervision environments that
students' perceive as open and supportive, the student will feel secure in opening
discussion on any potential dilemmas they may encounter as well as is discussing their
personal emotional reactions to such dilemmas. Such open environments, in which the
student has clear expectations regarding their role, the role of the supervisor and the goals
of supervision, moral sensitivity and moral reasoning will be enhanced as the learning of
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and use of the ethics code in daily practice is personalized for the student. In supervision
environments that are perceived as closed or hostile (i.e.; the 'hidden curriculum'), in
which the student feels vulnerable or at risk for admitting or disclosing any perceived
weaknesses or the student is unclear of the goals of supervision, development of moral
sensitivity and moral reasoning may be hampered in that any issues or concerns the
student may be experiencing will not be brought into an open discussion in an effort for
resolution or advancement of reasoning skills. In such closed situations, moral dilemmas
will not be discussed and the student will not benefit from the opportunity or experience
of learning to interpret the ethics code within their personal moral schema framework.
The findings of this study add to an under-investigated area and may greatly aid in
tailoring a moral climate that promotes the student-mentor relationship to adequately
foster moral schema development, especially in morally ambiguous or negative affect
situations.

··································································~
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Figure 2a. Mediator relationship to be examined.

Moral Climate

Figure 2b. Moderator relationship to be examined.
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Hypotheses

To test the conceptual model the following specific hypotheses will be examined.
1. Moral sensitivity will correlate with moral climate.
a. Moral sensitivity, as measured by affective empathy will positively
correlate with moral climate, as measured by the nurturance subscale
of the Leaming Environment Survey (LES).
b. Moral sensitivity, as measured by affective empathy, will negatively
correlate with moral climate, as measured by the role conflicts and
ambiguities scale from the Supervisees' Perception of Supervision
Experience (SPSE) survey.
c. Moral sensitivity, as measured by cognitive empathy, will positively
correlate with moral climate, as measured by the nurturance subscale
from the LES.
d. Moral sensitivity, as measured by cognitive empathy, will negatively
correlate with moral climate, as measured by the role conflicts and
ambiguities scale from the SPSE.
e. Moral sensitivity, as measured by total empathy, will positively
correlate with moral climate, as measured by the nurturance subscale
from the LES.
f

Moral sensitivity, as measured by total empathy, will negatively
correlate with moral climate, as measured by the role conflicts and
ambiguities scale from the SPSE.

2. Moral climate will correlate with moral reasoning.
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a. Moral climate, as measured by nurturance from the LES, will positively
correlate with moral reasoning, as measured by the N2 score and the U
score from the DIT-2.
b. Moral climate, as measured by the role conflicts and ambiguities scale
from the SPSE, will negatively correlate with moral reasoning, as
measured by the N2 score and the U score from the DIT-2.
3. Moral sensitivity will correlate with moral reasoning.
a. Moral sensitivity, as measured by affective empathy, will positively
correlate with moral reasoning, as measured by the N2 score and the U
score from the DIT-2.
b. Moral sensitivity, as measured by cognitive empathy, will positively
correlate with moral reasoning, as measured by the N2 score and the U
score from the DIT-2
c. Affective empathy will have a stronger positive correlation with moral
reasoning than cognitive empathy.
4. It will be determined whether moral climate mediates or moderates the
relationship between moral sensitivity and moral reasoning. Structural equation
modeling was used to test for mediator relationships. To investigate moral climate for a
mediator effect, first a significant relationship must exist between moral sensitivity and
moral reasoning. If a significant relationship is found, then the construct of moral climate
will be added to the model. If with the addition of moral climate, the relationship
between moral sensitivity and moral reasoning is no longer statistically significant or
remains significant due to sample size yet substantially diminishes in magnitude, then

41
moral climate is mediating this relationship. If no mediator effects are found, moral
climate will then be tested to determine if it moderates the relationship between moral
sensitivity and moral reasoning. A moderator term was created from the standardized
product of the main effects. Hierarchical regression was used to test for moderator
effects, entering each main effect in sequence and the moderator term on the final block.

If the addition of the moderator term is statistically significant, explaining variance above
and beyond the main effects, then moral climate moderates the relationship between
moral sensitivity and moral climate.
a. Moral climate will mediate the relationship between moral sensitivity,
as measured by cognitive empathy, and moral reasoning.
b. It will be determined whether moral climate mediates or moderates the
relationship between moral sensitivity, as measured by affective
empathy, and moral reasoning.
c. It will be determined whether moral climate mediates or moderates the
relationship between moral sensitivity, as measured by total empathy,
and moral reasoning.

Materials and Methods

Subjects
Subjects were recruited through a recruitment flyer (see Appendix A) requesting
participation in the research project from graduate-level clinical psychology students
currently enrolled in an academic program. Four-hundred-and twenty recruitment flyers
were distributed to student mailboxes at various southern California universities.
Additionally, an electronic copy of the recruitment flyer was posted on the APAGS
listservs; however, it is unknown how many potential subjects accessed the electronic
copy of the recruitment flyer. A total of 84 surveys were requested and 55 completed
surveys were returned, for a response rate of 65%. Subjects comprised all years of
graduate training in clinical psychology. Only graduate-level psychology students who
had completed supervised clinical work or who were currently being supervised in
clinical work were eligible to participate.
Of the 55 completed surveys returned, 52 subjects had usable data for analyses.
The final 52 participants consisted of 45 females and 7 males, with an average age of
30.9 years (sd = 6.8 years). Twenty-three subjects (44%) were enrolled in a Psy.D.
program, twenty-seven (52%) were enrolled in a Ph.D. program, one was enrolled in
Master's level program and one had completed her Ph.D. the month prior to completing
the survey and was now in a Post Doctoral position. Forty-eight participants were in a
clinical program (92%) and two indicated they were now in an experimental program
(4%). Program year ranged from first to greater than seven years, with 30 subjects (58%)
indicating that they were in their third, fourth, or fifth year. Thirty subjects (65%)
indicated membership in a national psychological association, and twelve (23%)
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indicated membership in a state psychological association. There were an average of 4.9
( sd = 3 .4) clinical supervisors, and a total of 28.4 months (sd = 19.4) of supervised
clinical experience across all supervision experiences, revealing a range of supervision
and professional development exposure.
Measures
All participants who requested a survey were provided with an Informed consent
(Appendix B). Demographic information, including age, gender, year in program, prior
degrees, professional licenses, professional or student affiliations, number of professional
presentations, number of publications, supervision experience valance rating (positive or
negative), length of time of rated supervision experience, total amount of supervision
experience, and total number of clinical supervisors were collected (see Appendix C).
Moral Sensitivity. Moral sensitivity, or the activation of a moral schema
including perspective taking ability, was operationalized by a multidimensional
assessment of empathy with the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis, 1983). This
measure (see Appendix C, items 7 - 34) has 28-items and asks subjects to indicate how
well each item describes them on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from Does not describe
me well to Does describe me well. The scale assesses affective and cognitive aspects of
empathy with the four subscales: perspective taking, personal distress, fantasy, and
empathic concern. The perspective taking subscale measures the individual's tendency to
understand the viewpoints of others, and sample items include, "When I am upset at
someone, I usually try to put myself in their shoes for a while," and "Before criticizing
somebody, I try to image how I would feel ifl were in their place." The personal distress
subscale measures the individual's feelings of anxiety in interpersonal situations, and
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sample items include, ''I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very
emotional situation," and "When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm (reversed
scored)." The fantasy subscale measures the individual's tendency to see things from the
viewpoint of characters in movies, novels or theatre, and sample items include, ''After
seeing a play or a movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters," and "When I
am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the events in the
story were happening to me." The empathic concern subscale measures the individual's
tendency to sympathize with the feelings of others, and sample items include, "I often
have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me," and "Sometimes I do
not feel sorry for people when they are having problems (reversed scored)." (Brems,
1988; Evans, Stanley, & Burrows, 1993; Morton, Worthley, Riggs, & Testerman, 2002).

In factor analysis, Brems (1988) found that the perspective taking and personal distress
subscales could be combined to create a cognitive empathy factor while the empathic
concern and fantasy subscales could be combined to create an affective empathy factor.

In the present study, perspective taking and personal distress were summed to create a
cognitive empathy score (14 items). Fantasy and empathic concern were summed to
create an affective empathy score ( 14 items). The cognitive and affective empathy scores
were summed to create a total empathy score (28 items). It appears that the affective
empathy component is tapping into awareness of affective and emotional arousal in
response to external triggers or the emotions others are experiencing, while the cognitive
empathy factor is tapping not into awareness of one's own affective and emotional
arousal but into awareness of the distress that another may be experiencing and how
perceives issues of personal control when they perceive that another person is
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experiencing emotional distress. Both the cognitive and affective factors were analyzed,

in addition to the total empathy score, in order to investigate if there were differences
related to the recognition, awareness and acceptance of one's emotional arousal (affective
empathy) and the awareness that another is experiencing distress and feeling of being
able to control oneself when others are experiencing distress (cognitive empathy). The
IR.I has demonstrated good test-retest reliability (. 62-. 81) and internal consistency (. 71.78) (Brems, 1988; Evans, Stanley, & Burrows, 1993; Coman, Evans, & Stanley, 1988;
Davis, 1983; Davis & Oathout, 1987; and Morton, Worthley, Riggs, & Testerman, 2001).
Davis and Oathout (1987) summarize validity studies of the IR.I, concluding that the scale
is measuring empathy. In the present study, each scale demonstrated good to adequate
reliability; affective empathy Cronbach' s a = . 78, cognitive empathy Cronbach' s a = . 59,
and the total empathy Cronbach's a= .80. Scores on affective empathy ranged from 34
to 69 (possible range: 14- 70), cognitive empathy scores ranged from 28 to 52 (possible
range: 14- 70), and total empathy scores ranged from 67 to 120 (possible range: 28 to
140 ), with higher scores indicating more empathy.
Moral Climate. Moral climate was assessed using an adaptation of the Medical
School Learning Environment Survey (LES) (Feletti & Clarke, 1981; Marshall, 1978;
Moore-West, Harrington, Mennin, Kaufman, & Skipper, 1989). The original scale
consisted of 50 items and was intended for students at a medical school, and was
demonstrated to generalize to other educational curricula (Feletti & Clarke, 1981). This
self-report subscale asked subjects to indicate how well each item reflects their
perceptions of the support of their learning environment on a 5-point Likert scale ranging
from This happens rarely,

if at all to This happens very frequently. In the present study,
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only the Nurturance subscale (4 items) (see Appendix C, items 35 - 38) to assess
students' perception of the support they are receiving from their academic institution was
used (Marshall, 1978). Sample items on the nurturance scale include, "The department
takes an interest in my personal welfare," and "When giving criticism or answering a
question, faculty appear to be genuinely interested in helping me." The reliability for
each of the subscales of the original 50 item version, ranges from .56- .82, while the
reliability for the total scale ranges from .85 - .94 (Feletti & Clarke, 1981, Marshall,
1978). Moore-West et al., (1989) examined a shortened 30-item version, in which five
subscales, Student-student Interaction, Emotional Climate, Nurturance, Meaningful
Learning Experience and Organizational Breadth of Interest, revealed internal
coefficients of reliability that ranged from .70 - .86, indicating moderate to high
reliability. In the present study, this scale demonstrated adequate reliability (Cronbach's

a= .81). Scores on this scale ranged from 7 to 20 (possible range: 4-20), with higher
scores indicating more of the construct being measured.
Moral climate was also assessed with the 29-item Supervisees' Perception of
Supervision Experience Scale (Olk & Friedlander, 1992). This self-report scale (see
Appendix C, items 40 - 68) asked subjects to describe their clinical supervision
experience and rate the impact of this supervision with the supervisor whom they believe
has made the greatest impact, positive or negative, on their professional and ethical
development. Participants were asked how well each item reflects their perception of
their supervision experience on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from This happens rarely,

if at all to This happens very frequently.

This measure consists of two subscales, Role

Ambiguity (16 items) and Role Conflict (13 items), which were summed for a Role
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Conflicts and Ambiguities score. The role ambiguity subscale measures uncertainty
about supervisory expectations, uncertainty in how to meet these expectations, and
uncertainty on how one will be evaluated in supervision. Sample items from the role
ambiguity scale include, "I was uncertain about what material to present to my
supervisor," "My supervisor's criteria for evaluating my work were not specific," and
"The feedback I got from my supervisor did not help me to know what was expected of
me in my day-to-day work with clients." The role conflict subscale measures experiences
associated with being in the role of a student-trainee in opposition to a professional
colleague who is expected to demonstrate autonomy in decision making. Sample items
from the role conflict scale include, "I believe that my supervisor's behavior in one or
more situations was unethical or illegal and I was undecided about whether to confront
him/her," "I felt that my supervisor was incompetent or less competent than I. I often felt
as if I was supervising him/her," and "I disagreed with my supervisor about
implementing a specific technique, but I also wanted to do what the supervisor thought
best." Olk and Friedlander report that the role ambiguity scale demonstrated Cronbach's

a= .91, and the role conflict scale a Cronbach's a= .89, and that the two scales were
significantly correlated (r = .59,p:::; .01). In the present study, each scale demonstrated
adequate reliability; role ambiguity Cronbach's a= .94, role conflict Cronbach's a= .92,
and total role conflicts and ambiguities Cronbach's a= .96. Role ambiguity scores
ranged from 16 to 68 (total possible range: 16- 80), role conflict scores ranged from 13
to 52 (possible range: 13 - 65), and total role conflicts and ambiguities ranged from 29 to

116 (possible range: 29- 145), with higher scores indicating more conflict or ambiguity.
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Moral Reasoning. The Defining Issues Test- 2 (DIT-2) (Rest, Narvaez, Thoma,
& Bebeau, 1999) was used to operationalize moral reasoning. The DIT-2 is an updated
and improved version of the DIT. Bebeau's (2002) review of the DIT and professional
education supports use of the DIT as an outcome measure of the influence of the moral
climate in academic settings. The DIT-2 updates the wording of the dilemmas, has fewer
items (five dilemmas instead of six), and gives more precise instructions. It continues to
measure personal interest, maintaining norms, and creating norms moral schemas.
Dilemmas include scenarios of free speech, euthanasia, providing for one's family, right
to know, and public access. The DIT and DIT-2 focus on tacit moral reasoning rather
than on the actual reasoning used by the subject (Walker, 2002). Subjects are asked to
read a dilemma and to rate on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from Great Importance to
No Importance 12 issues to be considered in the process of decision-making to resolve
the dilemma and then they are to rank the four most important of the 12 issues to be
considered in decision-making for each of five dilemmas. Additionally, on a 3-point
Likert scale, subjects were asked to indicate their favored action choice. Subjects must
pass each of five reliability checks to determine that reliable responses were provided.
The five reliability checks are: 1) rate-and-rank consistency - reliable subjects
demonstrate consistency in rating (the first task) and ranking (the second task) the same
item, if there is too much inconsistency (scores greater than 200) the assumption is that
the subject randomly responded or gave bogus data and is purged (one subject in the
preset study was purged for failing this reliability check); 2) meaningless items - these
are items that sound plausible but are deliberately designed to be meaningless, if too
many are endorsed (greater than 10) the assumption is that the subject is responding to
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the wording style rather than to the item meaning and is purged; 3) missing rates - an
occasional missed rating is tolerated; however, too many missed ratings (missing greater
than three of the 12 ratings invalidates a dilemma, one invalidated dilemma is toleratedthat is, at minimum, the subject must give at least nine ratings on each of four dilemmas
in order to pass this validity check) questions the subject's motivation to provide reliable
data and the subject is purged; 4) missing ranks - if a subject misses more than six ranks
they are purged; and 5) non-differentiation of rates or ranks - this occurs when a subject
rates all 12 issues the same or ranks the same item as 18\ 2°d, 3rd and 4th most important,
one invalidated dilemma is tolerated; that is, at minimum a subject must give at least two
different ratings to the 12 items on at least four dilemmas and they must select different
items in the rankings.
The present study used the N2 and the U scores. The N2 is an index of moral
reasoning development, and is a combination of the subjects' rankings of
postconventional items and differences between postconventional and personal interest
items (Walker, 2002). The authors report that the N2 index of the DIT-2 is
psychometrically superior to the P% index of the DIT. The U score is a utilizer score
and acts as a moderator variable between level of moral reasoning and action choice.
That is, the U score is an indicator of the fit between the items ranked as most important
and action choice, with the higher U scores indicating a good fit between the subjects'
ratings of important issues and rankings of the four most important issues (Rest, Narvaez,
Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999). Nucci (2002) reports that the U score improves the DIT's
ability to predict behavior. The usefulness of the N2 *U moderator term, as a measure of
the fit between level of reasoning skill and the action choice made, was also investigated.
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The DIT has been extensively studied and has demonstrated content validity,
predictive validity, convergent validity and internal consistency (Rest & Narvaez, 1998;
Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999). The DIT and DIT-2 are well correlated = .79.
Correction for attenuation reveals that the correlation between the DIT and DIT-2 is
between .95 - .99. Cronbach's alpha is in the upper .70's to lower .80's, which indicates
adequate internal reliability. A review of the items indicates that the DIT-2 has face
validity, and although prior research indicates that one can not 'fake good' on this
measure (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau & Thoma, 1999), there may be some concern that it may
sensitize subjects to look for moral dilemmas in the other measures. Educational level is
positively correlated with DIT-2 scores, although in the present study education level was
controlled for by only including graduate-level psychology students. DIT-2 scores are
moderately to strongly positively related to intelligence and GPA (r = .20 to .50), and
positively correlated to pro-social behaviors and professional decision making.
The DIT-2 was returned to the Center for the Study of Ethical Development for
scoring. One subject was purged due to failing one of the five reliability checks (scoring
greater than 200 on the rating-and-ranking consistency check), and one subject, although
passing all five reliability checks, did not provide enough data for a U score to be
computed. In many studies upwards of 15% of the sample are purged due to failing at
least one of the five reliability checks; however, in the present study only one subject
(2%) was purged for failing a reliability check, indicating that overall the subjects
provided reliable data. Due to the nature of this measure and the algorithms used in score
calculation, it is not possible to replace missing values, nor is it possible to calculate a
Cronbach's a from the data returned by the Center for the Study of Ethical Development.
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The returned N2 scores ranged from 12.55 to 70.20, and the U scores ranged from -.10 to
.46. These ranges are consistent with findings of graduate students in other academic
programs.

Procedures
As instructed in the recruitment flyer, interested subjects contacted the researcher
to have a survey packet mailed to them at an address of their choice. The survey packet
contained information on the study, the Informed Consent, survey completion
instructions, survey measures, an addressed and stamped raffle entry postcard (see
Appendix D) and a stamped, self-addressed return envelope. Anonymity was assured by
use of a subject number. The opportunity to enter a raffle for a chance to win one of two
$50.00 Gift Certificates for Amazon.com was provided with a separate raffle entry
postcard, indicating a telephone number or email address to contact the two winners.
Approximately two weeks following the mailing of the survey materials, a follow-up
thank you/reminder postcard (see Appendix E) was sent to all the participants who
received surveys. At that time, the addresses to which the surveys and follow-up thank
you/reminder postcard were sent to were destroyed.

Results
Prior to analysis the data were reviewed to assure that parametric assumptions
were met. Data were then analyzed at the univariate level followed by the multivariate
level, to explore the relationships among the measured variables and then among the
constructs of moral sensitivity, moral climate, and moral reasoning. Analyses then tested
moral climate for mediator and moderator effects on the relationship between moral
sensitivity and moral reasoning.
Data Screening

The histograms for the U score from the DIT-2 and the role conflicts and
ambiguities scale were slightly positively skewed; however, non-linear transformations
were not perfonned as regression and structural equation modeling are robust to
violations of normality. All other variables of interest were normally distributed. Outlier
criteria were set at greater than 3.5 standard deviations from the mean. No outliers
greater than 3.5 standard deviations from the mean were identified on any of the
measured variables of interest. One outlier was identified on time since rated
supervision, the supervision had occurred 10 years ago; however, as this is not a
measured variable of interest an examination of the correlations between the measured
variables of interest with this subject retained and removed were compared. The
comparison of the two correlation matrices indicated changes in correlation strength
occurred only at the 1ooth and 1oooth decimal place; thus, given the minimal change on
the relationships of the measured variables of interest this subject was retained. Scatter
plots of the measured variables of interest revealed linear relationships.

52

53
Characteristics ofSubjects
Three subjects had missing data; one subject was missing the U score from the
DIT-2 as they did not provide enough responses for calculati.on, one subject was missing
the N2 score from the DIT-2 due to being purged for failing the rating-and-ranking
reliability check, and one subject did not have cognitive empathy or total empathy scores
due to missing items nor did this subject have a nurturance scale total score as they did
not complete any items on this scale. These three subjects were removed from all further
analyses. Table 3 presents the demographic information of the initial sample (N = 55)
and the final sample (N = 52), and Table 4 presents data of the initial sample and the final
sample on supervision and professional involvement. In comparing the subjects with
missing data to the final sample, the missing data group was significantly older (M missing
=

41.33; M final= 30.90), t = 2.60,p = .01 and rated a more recent supervision experience

(months since supervision experience) (M missing= 14.00; M

final=

16.35), t = 3.08,p =

.003. No other significant differences were found on the demographic, supervision or
professional involvement variables. Table 5 presents the measured variables of interest
for the initial sample and the final sample. The group with missing data scored
significantly lower on the U score than the completion group (M missing= 0.02; M final=
0 .10 ), t = 3. 87, p

= . 01.

No other significant differences between the missing data group

and the completion group were noted on any of the measured variables.
In the final sample, year in program significantly correlated with total amount of
time in clinical supervision (r = .62, p = .01 ), time since rated supervision significantly
correlated with age (r = .30,p = .03), and length of rated supervision significantly
correlated with total amount of time in clinical supervision (r = .30,p = .04). As
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expected, as year in program increased, total amount of time in clinical supervision and
the number of clinical supervisors also increased.
Table 3
Demographics ofInitial Sample versus Final Sample
Initial Sample

Final Sample

(N = 55)
Age

Gender

Program
Currently
Emolledln

Program Type
Currently
Enrolled In

Program Year

Previously
Completed
Degree

(N = 52)

M

SD

M

SD

31.5

7.1

30.9

6.8

Male

8

7

Female

47

45

MAIMS

2

1

PsyD

24

23

PhD

28

27

Post Doc

1

1

Clinical

50

48

Experimental

2

2

Missing

3

2

First

6

5

Second

7

6

Third

10

9

Fourth

12

12

Fifth

9

9

Sixth

6

6

Seventh

4

4

Other

1

1

BA/BS

15

15

MAIMS

38

35

Doctorate

1

1

MFT

1

1
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Table 4

Professional and Sul!_ervision ExP._erience ofInitial Saml!_le versus Final Saml!_le
Initial Sample (N = 55)

Final Sample (N =
52)

APA

25

45.45%

24

46.15%

APA/APAGS

7

12.73%

6

11.54%

APAJAPS

1

1.82%

1

1.92%

APA/APIC

1

1.82%

1

1.92%

APA/APAGS/APIC

2

3.64%

2

3.85%

None

19

34.55%

18

34.62%

California

3

5.45%

2

9.62%

Maryland

5

9.09%

5

9.62%

Georgia

1

1.82%

0

0.00%

WPA

3

5.45%

3

5.77%

California & WPA

1

1.82%

1

1.92%

Oregon

1

1.82%

1

1.92%

None

41

74.55%

40

76.92%

M

SD

M

SD

Number of Poster Presentations

2.5

4.4

2.6

4.6

Number of Publications

.8

1.1

.7

1.1

Number of Supervision Months of
Rated Supervision
Time Since Rated Supervision

8.9

5.6

9.0

5.7

20.0

39.0

16.35

34.6

27.5

19.3

28.4

19.4

4.8

3.3

4.9

3.4

National
Professional
Memberships

State
Professional
Memberships

Total Number of Supervision
Months
Number of Clinical Supervisors

Note. APA - American Psychological Association; APAGS - American Psychological
Association Graduate Students; APS - American Psychological Society; APIC - ; WPA
- Western Psychological Association

Correlations between professional activities and supervision experience variables
were examined. In examining potential differences by National Professional
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Membership, differences were found in number of poster presentations (p = .01) and
number of publications (p = .01). Specifically, these differences by National Professional
Membership were due to one participant, a member of both APA and APAGS having
been involved in significantly more poster presentations (25) than all other subjects (M =
2.6), while another two subjects, both members of APA, APAGS and APS had
significantly more publications (3) than the other subjects (M = .63). At the State
Professional Membership level, members of the Maryland State Psychological
Association had significantly (p = .01) more publications (2.40) thanthe other subjects
(M = .60). The correlations between the professional activities and the measured
constructs were also examined; however, no meaningful or significant correlations were
found between professional activities and moral sensitivity, moral climate and moral
reasoning.
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Table 5

Means and Standard Deviations ofMeasured Variables ofInterest
Initial Sample (N =
Final Sample (N =
55)

52)

M

SD

M

SD

Moral

N2 Score

47.1

13.8

47.4

13.3

Reasoning

U Score

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

Nurturance

14.8

3.7

14.8

3.7

59.6

25.5

58.3

25.0

Affective

52.4

7.0

52.3

7.2

Cognitive

41.0

5.4

41.1

5.2

Total Empathy

93.4

10.9

93.4

10.8

Moral
Role Conflicts and
Climate
Ambiguities

Moral
Sensitivity

Potential Covariates
In the final sample some group differences were noted on the measured variables
of interest. Females scored significantly higher on cognitive empathy (M females= 41.9; M
males=

35.6), t

=

3.3,p = .002, and total empathy (M females= 94.6; M males= 85.7), t

=

2.1,

p = .04 than males. Differences were also noted between subjects who chose to rate a

positive supervision experience (N = 38) instead of a negative supervision experience (N
=

14). Those who rated a positive supervision experience were significantly older than

those who rated a negative supervision experience (M positive= 32.5; M negative= 26.5), t =

4.7,p = .001, and scored significantly higher on the N2 score (M positive= 49.6; M negative=
41.3), t = 2.0,p = .05. Additionally, persons who rated a negative supervision experience
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scored significantly higher on role conflicts and ambiguities (M negative= 86.6; M positive=
47.9), t = 6.8,p = .001 than those who rated a positive supervision experience. As age is
correlated with moral development, the differences found in the N2 scores and the role
conflicts and ambiguities scores were investigated to determine if they could be attributed
to age. Age was partialled out and investigated whether or not these positive versus
negative supervision experience differences were maintained by examining the
standardize residuals. The two rating groups were no longer significantly different on N2
scores; however, persons who rated a negative supervision experience still scored
significantly higher on role conflict and ambiguities (M negative= 1.00; M positive= -.37), t =
5.55,p = .001. This difference in the role conflict and ambiguities score is of interest;

however, due to the overall small sample size and having so few persons who rated a
negative supervision experience, these groups were collapsed as there was not enough
power to run separate analyses. Due to these differences, age and supervision valence
rating (positive or negative) were used as covariates in all multivariate analyses. No
significant group differences were found by program currently enrolled in, program type
(clinical versus experimental), program year, or previously completed degree on the
measured variables of moral sensitivity, moral climate or moral reasoning.
Results

The correlations among the measured variables of interest are presented in Table
6. None of the correlations are strong enough to risk multicollinearity. Although both
affective empathy and cognitive empathy are strongly and significantly correlated with
total empathy, multicollinearity is not a problem as the analyses do not examine the
subscales and total empathy within the same analyses. As shown in Table 6, the
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nurturance subscale is weakly correlated with the U score; however it does not positively
correlate with N2, affective empathy, cognitive empathy nor total empathy. Due to weak
correlations within the construct of moral climate, nurturance was removed from further
analyses. Also shown in Table 6, the N2*U variable is weakly correlated with affective
empathy, cognitive empathy, total empathy, and due to the weak correlations within the
construct of moral reasoning, N2*U was removed from further analyses.
All measured variables were standardized prior to further analyses to account for
differences in scale metrics. As noted previously, education was controlled for by only
including graduate-level psychology students. Age and supervision valence rating
(positive versus negative) were used as covariates in all subsequent analyses to account
for maturation and the group difference between those who rated a positive versus
negative supervision experience. All mediator and moderator relationships were tested
for according to the procedure indicated by Baron and Kenny (1986).
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Table 6

Correlations among Measured Variables
Moral Reasoning

1

2

3

Moral
Climate
4
5

Moral Sensitivity

6

7

8

N2
2

U Score

Moral
Reasoning

4

Nurturance

Moral
Climate

.14
-.07

-.02

-.08

.21

.12

-.31*

-.03

-.23

-.12

.30*

-.05

-.08

-.04

.04

.06

-.05

-.05

-.04

.05

.s2**

.22

-.06

-.08

-.05

.05

.91 **

5

Role Conflicts

and Ambiguities
6

Affective

Empathy
7

Moral
Sensitivity

Cognitive

Empathy
8

p :S .05,

Total Empathy

.s2**

p :S .01.

Moral climate's associations with moral sensitivity and moral reasoning were
examined first. The hypotheses regarding the positive correlation of a nurturing
academic environment and moral sensitivity and moral reasoning was not supported as
moral climate, as measured by nurturance, did not correlate with moral sensitivity, as
measured by affective, cognitive or total empathy, or moral reasoning, as measured by
the N2, U score or N2*U score (see Table 6). The hypothesis that moral climate, as
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measured by role ambiguity, role conflict and role conflicts and ambiguities, would
negatively correlate with moral sensitivity, as measured by affective empathy, cognitive
empathy and total empathy, was not supported (see Tables 6 and 7). However, the
hypothesis that moral climate, as measured by role conflict, role ambiguity, and role
conflicts and ambiguities, would negatively correlate with moral reasoning was partially
supported (see Tables 6 and 7). Role conflict, role ambiguity, and role conflicts and
ambiguities negatively correlate with the N2 score as a measure of moral reasoning.
Table 7

Correlations between Moral Climate, Moral Sensitivity and Moral Reasoning
Moral Climate
Role Conflicts
Role Ambiguity

Role Conflict
and Ambiguities

Moral
Reasoning

Moral
Sensitivity

1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

3

U Score

-.10

-.04

-.14

.06

.10

.06

-.03

.03

-.06

N2

... Jl*

-.27

-.17

-.28* -.25

-.16

-.31*

-.27

-.18

Affective

.07

.06

-.10

-.002

-.01

-.15

.04

.03

-.13

Cognitive

.04

.05

-.02

.05

.05

-.001

.05

.05

-.01

Total
.07
.06 -.07
.02
.02 -.10
.05
.05 -.09
Em2athy
Note. * p :S .05. 1 =zero-order correlations. 2 =partial correlation after age removed. 3 =
partial correlation after age and supervision valence rating (positive versus negative)
removed.

The relationships of the measured variables of moral sensitivity and moral
reasoning were examined next (see Table 8). Prior to any covariates, affective empathy
is positively correlated with the N2 score (r = .30). No other empathy and moral
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reasoning correlations were significant. Partialling out age had minimal impact on the
relationships (see Table 8); however, upon partialling out age and supervision valence
rating (positive or negative), total empathy became positively correlated with N2. Thus,
at the measured variable level, only affective empathy positively correlates with moral
reasoning (N2). These findings partially support hypothesis three, that moral sensitivity
will positively correlate with moral reasoning and that affective empathy will
demonstrate the strongest correlation with moral reasoning. Additionally, these findings,
demonstrating a significant correlation between moral sensitivity and moral reasoning
provide the basis for testing the mediator relationships described in hypothesis four.
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Table 8
Correlations between Moral Sensitivity and Moral Reasoning with Age and Supervision
Valence as Covariates
Moral Reasoning

U Score
Moral
Sensitivity

N2 Score

1

2

3

1

2

3

Affective
Empathy

-.05

-.04

-.06

.30*

.31*

.37**

Cognitive
Empathy

-.05

-.05

-.06

.06

.06

.08

Total Empathy

-.06

-.05

-.07

.22

.24

.28*

Note. * p :S .05, ** p :S .01. 1 =zero order correlations, 2 =partial correlation after age
removed, 3 = partial correlation after age and supervision valence removed.
As stated previously, moral sensitivity initiates the moral reasoning process, thus
implying a positive correlation between these two constructs. However, there may be
other variables that either mediate or moderate this relationship. Rest and others
recommend isolating facets of the individual components to reveal insights into the
patterns of relationships of the four components with each other and with other variables
over time. For the present study, empathy, measured both cognitively and affectively,
was isolated as one facet of moral sensitivity. The construct of moral reasoning was
assessed using the N2 and U scores. The results reveal how these measures are related at
the univariate and bivariate levels; however, as more than one measure was used to
define each component, structural equation modeling and regression analyses were used
to investigate the relationships among the components at the multivariate level. All
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multivariate analyses were done on the residuals after covarying out age and supervision
valence (positive or negative).
Baron and Kenny (1986) emphasize the importance of not using the terms
mediator and moderator interchangeably. They discuss the difficulty in distinguishing if
a variable is a potential mediator or moderator, and suggest that the suspected variable be
tested for both mediator and moderator effects. The present study followed the steps
recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986) and Ironson, Solomon, Balbin, O'Cleirigh,
George, Kumar, Larson, and Woods (2002) to test for mediator and moderator effects.
To test for a mediated effect, initially a significant relationship must be established
between the independent variable and the dependent variable. A mediated effect occurs
when a third variable accounts for the relationship between an independent variable and
the dependent variable. That is, the independent variable is meaningfully correlated with
the mediating variable and the mediating variable is meaningfully correlated with the
dependent variable, and with the addition of the mediating variable the independent
variable is no longer meaningfully related to the dependent variable. According to Baron
and Kenny a mediated effect occurs if the once significant relationship between the
independent variable and the dependent variable is no longer significant with the addition
of the mediating variable; however, in larger samples this relationship may remain
significant due to sample size while the magnitude of the relationship substantially
diminishes to indicate a mediated effect. If the independent-dependent correlation
becomes zero with the addition of the mediating variable, then the mediating variable
fully mediates this relationship. If the independent-dependent correlation is no longer
significant (or remains significant due to a larger sample size but the magnitude
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substantially decreases) but the absolute value is greater than zero then the mediating
variable is partially mediating this relationship and there are other mediating variables.
In the situation where multiple measures are used to measure a construct, Baron and

Kenny recommend using structural equation modeling methods to test for a mediator
effect. In the present study, moral climate is a suspected mediator variable and its
potential mediator effects were tested on the relationship between moral sensitivity and
moral reasoning.
A moderator effect occurs when the suspected moderating variable influences the
relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable (Baron &
Kenny, 1986). A moderator is the interaction of the two main effects (independent
variable x moderator variable), and a moderator effect occurs when the relationship
between the independent variable and the dependent variable changes as a function of the
level of the moderator variable. Baron and Kenny recommend using a hierarchical
regression procedure to test for moderator effects by adding the moderator term to the
regression equation. First, a moderator term is created by computing the product of the
standardized scores of the independent variable and the suspected moderator variable. In
the present study, moral sensitivity x moral climate was tested as the moderator term.
Then a hierarchical regression is used to test if the moderator term is significant and adds
a meaningful proportion of variance explained above and beyond the independent
variable and the suspected moderator variable. That is, in hierarchical regression, the
independent variable is entered on block one, the suspected moderator variable is entered
on block two, and the moderator term is entered on block three. A moderator effect
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occurs when the moderator term adds a meaningful proportion of variance explained to
the overall model.
Moral climate, as measured by role conflicts and ambiguities, was first
investigated to determine if it mediated or moderated the relationship between cognitive
empathy and moral reasoning, as measured N2 and U score. To test whether a mediator
or a moderator effect may exist, a statistically significant relationship between cognitive
empathy and moral reasoning, as measured by N2 and U score must first be demonstrated
(see Figure 3).

N2
i.o <R2 = .99)
.o9 <R2 = .01)

Cognitive
Empathy

.12 <R2 =.on

U score

Figure 3. Determining if there is a significant relationship between cognitive empathy
and moral reasoning after age and supervision valence removed. Unstandardized
Solution.

The model in Figure 3 was supported,/ (1, N = 52) = 0.23 (p = .63), CFI = 0.56,
AIC = -1. 77, and did not represent a good fit nor reveal a significant relationship between
cognitive empathy and moral reasoning, as measured by N2 and U scores. As the first
criteria for testing for a mediator effect was not met, that the independent and dependent
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variable correlate, moral climate was not tested for a mediator effect on the relationship
between cognitive empathy and moral reasoning.
To test if moral climate, as measured by role conflicts and ambiguities, may be
moderating the relationship between cognitive empathy and moral reasoning, a
hierarchical regression was used to predict the N2 score. Age and supervision valence
rating (positive or negative) were used as covariates in block one, cognitive empathy was
entered on block two, moral climate (role conflicts and ambiguities) was entered on block
three, and the moderator term (cognitive empathy*moral climate) was entered on block
four.

Regression results are presented in Table 9 and the coefficients are presented in

Table 10. The full model accounted for 19% (AdjustedR2 = 10%) of the variance in the
N2 score (see Table 9). The moderator term, cognitive empathy*moral climate,
explained 6% of the variance above and beyond the rest of the model and approached
statistical significance (p = .07). This is a meaningful finding given the low power
inherent in such a small sample, and it is likely that in a larger sample this moderator
would be statistically significant. This finding indicates that moral climate, as measured
by role conflicts and ambiguities, moderates the relationship between cognitive empathy
and moral reasoning. Figure 4 presents the moderator effect of moral climate. As can be
seen in Figure 4, there is more variance in N2 scores at higher levels of moral climate
(role conflicts and ambiguities). When students perceive role conflicts and ambiguities in
their supervision experience, moral reasoning is not positively impacted. At higher levels
of role conflicts and ambiguities it is not possible to predict moral reasoning.
An examination of the standardized beta weights in Table· l 0, reveals that the
moderator term is a significant predictor of the N2 score (beta= -.25,p = .07). The

68
hypothesis that moral climate, as measured by role conflicts and ambiguities, mediates
the relationship between cognitive empathy and moral reasoning was not supported; it
appears that it moderates this relationship.
Table 9

Testing for Moderator Effect ofMoral Climate (Role Conflicts and Ambiguities) on
Cognitive Emp_athy__ and Moral Reasoning
Ri
Sig. F
Adjusted.
F
If
Model
R
Change Change Change
R2
Age, Supervision
l

.30

.09

.05

.31

.10

.04

.35

.13

.43

.19

2.45

.10

.006

.30

.59

.05

.03

1.53

.22

.10

.06

3.49

.07

Valence
2

Cognitive Empathy
Moral Climate (Role

3

Conflicts and
Ambiguities)
Moderator (Cognitive

4

Empathy*Moral
Climate)

Table 10

Coefficients for Testing for Moderator Effect ofMoral Climate (Role Conflicts and
Ambiguities) on Cognitive Empathy and Moral Reasoning

t

Age

.13

.85

Supervision
Valence

-.23

Age

Model

1

2

3

4

Correlations

StandardizedBeta

p

Zeroorder

Partial

SemiPartial

.40

.22

.12

.12

-1.53

.13

-.28

-.21

-.21

.12

.82

.42

.22

.. 12

.11

Supervision
Valence

-.24

-1.56

.13

-.28

-.22

-.21

Cognitive Empathy

.08

.54

.59

.06

.08

.08

Age

.14

.91

.38

.22

.13

.12

Supervision
Valence

-.07

-.33

.74

-.28

-.05

-.05

Cognitive Empathy

.07

.53

.60

.06

.08

.07

Moral Climate
(Role Conflicts and
Ambiguities)

-.23

-1.24

.22

-.31

-.18

-.17

Age

.17

1.15

.26

.22

.17

.15

Supervision
Valence

-.10

-.50

.62

-.28

-.07

-.07

Cognitive Empathy

.09

.68

.50

.06

.10

.09

Moral Climate
(Role Conflicts and
Ambiguities)

-.20

-1.06

.30

-.31

-.15

-.14

Cognitive
Empathy*Moral
Climate

-.25

-1.87

.07

-.22

-.27

-.25
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Figure 4. Interaction plot for Cognitive Empathy*Moral Climate
Moral climate, as measured by role conflicts and ambiguities, was next
investigated to determine if it mediated or moderated the relationship between affective
empathy and moral reasoning, as measured N2 and U scores. To test whether a mediator
or a moderator effect may exist, a statistically significant relationship between affective
empathy and moral reasoning, as measured by N2 and U score must first be demonstrated
(see Figure 5).
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N2
1.0 (k = .99)

.37*

(k = .14)

Affective
Empathy

U score

Figure 5. Establishing a significant relationship between affective empathy and moral
reasoning after removing age and supervision valence. Unstandardized Solution. * p :S
.01

The model in Figure 5 was supported,

I

(1, N = 52) = .69 (p = .41), CFI = 1.00,

AIC = -1.31, establishing a significant relationship between affective empathy and moral
reasoning (R = .37), as measured by N2 and U scores. The first criteria for testing for a
mediator effect are met. From this model, moral climate was entered to test for a
mediator effect (see Figure 6).
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N2

.35*

Affective
Empathy

<R2 = .13)

E=0.01

.12 <R2 =.on

-.13

<R2 = .02)
-.13

<R2 = .02)

Moral Climate (Role
Conflicts and
Ambiguities)
Figure 6. Testing if moral climate mediates the relationship between affective empathy

and moral reasoning after age and supervision valence removed. Unstandardized
Solution. * p :S .01
Although the model presented in Figure 6 was supported,/ (2, N = 52) = 0.80 (p
=

.67), CFI = 1.00, AIC = -3.20, the relationship between affective empathy and moral

reasoning remains statistically significant (R = .35), thus moral climate does not mediate
this relationship. The addition of moral climate to the model only marginally impacted
the relationship between affective empathy and moral reasoning; without moral climate
in the model affective empathy accounted for 14% of the variance in moral reasoning and
with moral climate added to the model affective empathy accounted for 13% of the
variance in moral reasoning. The pathway from affective empathy to moral reasoning
was removed to test the fit of the model (Figure 7). The removal ofthis pathway resulted
in a model that was not supported,

i

(3, N = 52) = 7.66 (p = .05), CFI = .04, AIC = 1.66.
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Table 11 presents a comparison of the models for testing whether moral climate mediates
the relationship between affective empathy and moral reasoning.
N2
1.0 (.R2 = .99)

Affective
Empathy

.12 (R2 =
.01)

U score
-.13

(.R2 = .01)

-.18*

(.R2 = .03)

Moral Climate
(Role Conflicts
and Ambiguities)

Figure 7. Removal of pathway from affective empathy and moral reasoning after age
and supervision valence removed. Unstandardized Solution. * p :::; .10

Table 11

Model Comparisons testing whether Moral Climate (Role Conflicts and Ambiguities)
mediates the relationship between Affective Empathy and Moral Reasoning after age and
supervision valence removed
Model
Scale
DJ
p
CF!
AJC

i

Testing the relationship between Affective
Empathy & Moral Reasoning (Figure 5)

.69

1

.41

1.00

-1.31

Add Moral Climate (Role Conflicts and
Ambiguities) to Model (Figure 6)

.80

2

.67

1.00

-3.20

7.66

3

.05

.04

1.66

Remove pathway between Affective
Empathy and Moral Reasoning (Figure 7)
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Using the CFI and AIC criteria (see Table 11), the model presented in Figure 6 is
best supported; indicating both affective empathy and moral climate influence moral
reasoning, and that moral climate does not mediate the relationship between affective
empathy and moral reasoning. However, this does not detennine whethe~ moral climate
moderates the relationship between affective empathy and moral reasoning. A
hierarchical regression was run to see if moral climate moderates the relationship
between affective empathy and moral reasoning. Age and supervision valence rating
(positive or negative) were used as covariates in block one, affective empathy was
entered on block two, moral climate was entered on block three, and the moderator term
(affective empathy*moral climate) was entered on block four. Regression results are
presented in Table 12 and the coefficients are presented in Table 13. As seen in Table
12, the overall model accounted for 23.9% (Adjusted R2 = 15.6%) of the variance in the
N2 score. The moderator term explained .9% of the variance above and beyond the rest
of the model and was not statistically significant (p = .45). Only the addition of affective
empathy to this model was statistically significant, explaining 12.4% of the variance in
the N2 score.
An examination of the standardized beta weights in Table 13 reveals that

affective empathy is a significant predictor of the N2 score (beta= .34). Moral Climate,
as measured by role conflicts and ambiguities, does not mediate or moderate the
relationship between affectiye empathy and moral reasoning. Although the relationship
between affective empathy and moral reasoning is not mediated or moderated by moral
climate, overall the total model accounts for a meaningful proportion of variance in moral
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reasoning, thus the impact of affective empathy and moral climate on moral reasoning
can not be discounted.
Table 12

Testing/or Moderator Effect ofMoral Climate (Role Conflicts and Ambiguities) on the
relationshi between A ective Em ath and Moral Reasoning
Sig. F
Adjusted
F
Model
R
If
R1
Change Change Change
Age, Supervision
1

2.45

.10

.12

7.59

.008

.17

.02

.95

.34

.16

.01

.54

.47

.30

.09

.05

.46

.22

.17

.48

.23

.49

.24

Valence
2

Affective Empathy
Moral Climate (Role

3

Conflicts and
Ambiguities)
Moderator (Affective

4

Empathy*Moral
Climate)
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Table 13

Coefficients for Testing for Moderator Effect ofMoral Climate (Role Conflicts and
Ambig_uitiesJ on the relationship_ between Affective Emp_athy and Moral Reasoning_
Model

1

Age
Supervision
Valence
Age

2

Supervision
Valence
Affective Empathy
Age

3

Supervision
Valence
Affective Empathy
Moral Climate
(Role Conflicts
and Ambiguities2
Age
Supervision
Valence
Affective Empathy

4

Moral Climate
(Role Conflicts
and Ambiguities)
Affective
Empathy*Moral
Climate

Correlations

Standardized Beta

t

.13

.85

.40

Zeroorder
.22

-.23

-1.53

.13

.12

.82

-.30

p

.12

SemiPartial
.12

-.28

-.21

-.21

.42

.22

.12

.11

..2.12

.04

-.28

-.29

-.27

.36

2.75

.008

.30

.37

.35

.13

.89

.38

.22

.13

.11

-.17

-.89

.38

-.28

-.13

-.11

.34

2.60

.01

.30

.36

.33

-.17

-.97

.34

-.31

-.14

-.12

.13

.91

.37

.22

.13

.12

-.13

-.66

.51

-.28

-.10

-.09

.27

1.57

.12

.30

.23

.20

-.21

-1.12

.27

-.31

-.16

-.14

-.12

-.73

.47

-.26

-.11

-.09

Partial

The relationships between the constructs of moral sensitivity, as measured by
affective empathy and cognitive empathy, and moral reasoning, as measured by N2 and
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U scores, were examined next (see Figure 8). This model was supported, x..2 (1, N = 52) =
1.71 (p = .19), CFI = 0.96, AIC = -.29. Moral sensitivity positively correlated with moral
reasoning (R = .37). Both error terms for N2 and affective empathy were constrained at
the lower bound. The error terms for N2 and affective empathy were set at E = 0.01 as
shown in Figure 9. Relaxing the error terms for N2 and affective empathy also resulted
in a supported model, x..2 (3, N = 52) = 1.75 (p = .62), CFI = 1.00, AIC = -4.25.
According to the CFI and AIC criteria, the adjusted model resulted in a better fit;
although at the measurement level the constructs are not cohesive due the variation in
magnitude of each measured variable with the construct. No further post hoc adjustments
were made to this model.

Affective
Empathy

N2 Score
1.0 <R2 = .99)

1.0 <R2 = .99)

.37* <R2 = .14)

.52*

Cognitive
Empathy

<R2 = .27)
U Score

Figure 8. Testing if Moral Sensitivity and Moral Reasoning are significantly related after
removing age and supervision valence. Unstandardized solution.* p:::; .005
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E=O.Ol
E = 0.01

Affective
Empathy

N2 Score

i.o <R2 = .99)

1.0 <R2 = .99*)
.37* (R2 = .14)

.52**

Cognitive
Empathy

<R2 = .27)

.14 <R2 = .02)

U Score

Figure 9. Model adjusted for constraints. Unstandardized solution. * p :S .005,
.001

** p :S

To test if the moral climate may mediate this relationship, a significant
relationship between moral sensitivity and moral reasoning first needed to be established;
this finding is presented in Figure 9, revealing that moral sensitivity is.positively
correlated with moral reasoning (R = .37). The criterion to test for a mediator effect is
met. From this model, moral climate was entered to test whether it mediated the
relationship between moral sensitivity and moral reasoning (see Figure 10).
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E= 0.01
E=0.01

Affective
Empathy

N2 Score
1.0 (/f = .99)

.36* (/f = .13)

.52** (/f

.12 <If=

= .27)

.on

Cognitive
Empathy
-.13· (K = .02)

-.13 (lf

= .02)

Moral Climate
(Role Conflicts
and Ambiguities)

Figure 10. Testing Moral Climate Mediator Effect between Moral Sensitivity and Moral
Reasoning after removing age and supervision valence. Unstandardized Solution. * p :::::;
.005, ** p:::::; .001
The model presented in Figure 10 was supported,

i' (5, N = 52) = 1.98 (p = .85),

CFI = 1.00, AIC = -8.02. No post hoc adjustments were made to this model. As the
pathway between moral sensitivity and moral reasoning remains significant and moral
sensitivity remains meaningfully related (R = .36) to moral reasoning, moral climate does
not mediate this relationship. The fit of the model with the pathway between moral
sensitivity and moral reasoning removed was then tested (see Figure 11 ).
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E=0.01
E=0.01

Affective
Empathy

N2 Score
1.0 <R2 = .99)

.52*
.27)

(R2 =
.12 <R2 = .01)

Cognitive
Empathy
-.13

(R2 = .02)

-.18 CR!= .03)

Moral Climate (Role
Conflicts and
Ambiguities)

Figure 11. Pathway between Moral Sensitivity and Moral Reasoning removed.
Unstandardized Solution. * p ~ .005

The model presented in Figure 11 was also supported,

i' (6, N = 52) = 8.81, (p =

.18), CFI = .84, AIC = -3.20; however moral sensitivity is not correlated with moral
climate and moral climate is not correlated with moral reasoning. Table 14 presents a
comparison of the models for testing whether moral climate mediates the relationship
between moral sensitivity and moral reasoning. Using the CFI and AIC criteria (see
Table 14), the model presented in Figure 10 is the best supported, indicating that both
moral sensitivity and moral climate impact moral reasoning, and that moral climate does
not mediate the relationship between moral sensitivity and moral reasoning. However,
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this does not determine whether the relationship between moral sensitivity and moral
reasoning is moderated by moral climate.
Table 14

Model Comparisons testing whether Moral Climate (Role Conflicts and Ambiguities)
mediates the relationship between Moral Sensitivity and Moral Reasoning after age and
supervision valence removed
Model
Scale/ DJ
p
CF! AIC
Testing the-relationship between Moral

1.71

1

.19

.96

-.29

1.75

3

.62

1.00

-4.25

1.98

5

.85

1.00

-8.02

8.81

6

.18

.84

-3.20

Sensitivity and Moral Reasoning (Figure 8)
Relax error constraints for N2 and Affective
Empathy (Figure 9)
Add Moral Climate (Role Conflicts and
Ambiguities) to Model (Figure 10)
Remove pathway between Moral Sensitivity
and Moral Reasoning (Figure 11)

To test if moral climate may be moderating the relationship between moral
sensitivity and moral reasoning, a hierarchical regression was used to predict the N2
score. Age and supervision valence rating (positive or negative) were used as covariates
in block one, total empathy score was entered on block two, moral climate (role conflicts
and ambiguities) was entered on block three, and the moderator term (total
empathy*moral climate) was entered on block four.

Regression results are presented in

Table 15 and the coefficients are presented in Table 16. As seen in Table 15, the full
model accounted for 24% (Adjustedk= 15%) of the variance in the N2 score. The
moderator term explained 5% of the variance above and beyond the rest of the model and
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was approached statistical significance (p = .08). This is a meaningful finding given the
low power of the small sample; and the moderator may be statistically significant in a
larger sample.
An examination of the standardized beta weights in Table 16, reveals that the
moderator term, total empathy*moral climate, is the strongest predictor of the N2 score in
the final model and approaches statistical significance (beta= -.24,p = .08).
Table 15
Testing for Moderator Effect ofMoral Climate (Role Conflict and Ambiguities) on Moral
Sensitivity and Moral Reasoning
Adjusted
ii1
F
Sig. F
Model
R
If
If
Change Change Change
1

Age, Supervision Valence

2

Total Empathy

3

Moral Climate (Role
Conflicts and Ambiguities)

4

Moderator (Total
Climate)

.30

.09

.05

.40

.16

.11

.43

.18

.49

.24

2.45

.10

.07

4.15

.05

.12

.02

1.22

.28

.15

.05

3.14

.08

Em~athy*Moral

Figure 12 presents the moderator effect of moral climate on the relationship
between moral sensitivity and moral reasoning. As can be seen in Figure 12, there is
more variance in N2 scores at higher levels of role conflicts and ambi~ities. When
students perceive role conflicts and ambiguities in their supervision experience moral
reasoning is not positively impacted. At higher levels of role conflicts and ambiguities it
is not possible to predict moral reasoning.

Table 16
Coefficients for Testing/or Moderator Effect ofMoral Climate (Role Conflicts and
Amb ig_uities) on Moral Sensitivity and Moral Reasoning_
Correlations
Standardt
p
Model
Semi
Zeroized Beta
Partial
Order
Partial
1

2

3

4

Age

.13

.85

.40

.22

.12

.12

Supervision
Valence

-.23

-1.53

.13

-.28

-.21

-.21

Age

.16

.80

.43

.22

.11

.11

Supervision
Valence

-.28

-1.90

.06

-.28

-.26

-.25

Total Empathy

.27

2.04

.05

.22

.28

.27

Age
Supervision
Valence

.13

.88

.39

.22

.13

.12

-.13

-.66

.51

-.28

-.10

-.09

Total Empathy

.26

1.93

.06

.22

.27

.26

Moral Climate
(Role Conflicts
and Ambiguities2

-.20

-1.10

.28

-.31

-.16

-.15

Age

.15

1.04

.31

.22

.15

.13

Supervision
Valence

-.10

-.53

.60

-.28

-.08

-.07

Total Empathy

.17

1.24

.22

.22

.18

.16

Moral Climate
(Role Conflicts
and Ambiguities)

-.22

-1.23

.23

-.31

-.18

-.16

Empathy*Moral
Climate

-.24

-1.77

.08

-.28

-.25

-.23
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Figure 12. Interaction plot for Total Empathy*Moral Climate
The hypothesis that moral climate, as measured by role conflicts and ambiguities,
moderates the relationship between moral sensitivity and moral reasoning is supported.

Discussion
The impact of moral climate on two components of Rest's Four Component
Model of Moral Behavior, moral sensitivity and moral reasoning, was investigated. After
controlling for age and supervision valence, moral sensitivity, as measured by affective
empathy and cognitive empathy, is significantly correlated with moral reasoning, as
measured by N2 and U scores. It is likely that affective empathy is most important in
describing this relationship, as affective empathy and moral reasoning were neither
mediated nor moderated by moral climate. Thus, psychology graduate students' affective
empathy skills directly impact their level of moral reasoning regardless of the moral
climate. However, the relationship between cognitive empathy and moral reasoning is
moderated by moral climate. In this case, a negative moral climate, defined as role
conflict and ambiguities in clinical supervision, interacts with poor perspective taking and
increased personal distress (cognitive empathy) to adversely impact moral reasoning.
These findings have both theoretical and applied implications.
For the moral reasoning process to be initiated, a moral schema must be activated
via moral sensitivity. Affective empathy alone is sufficient to initiate moral reasoning;
however, cognitive empathy alone is not sufficient to initiate moral reasoning. That is,
cognitive empathy interacts with the moral climate to cue and impact the level of moral
reasoning. For example, an immature empathic response may be taking another's
perspective until personal distress is experienced. At the point of personal distress, the
empathy process may shut down and thereby circumvent the moral reasoning process.
By distancing oneself from the dilemma to avoid an emotional reaction, one's moral
schema may not be activated and thus the moral reasoning process
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is not initiated. Alternatively, a lack of an affective empathy response may potentially
reduce the level of moral reasoning due to the interplay of emotion and cognition in the
reasoning process (Damasio, 1994). Supervision experiences may assist students to
become aware of cognitive and emotional responses to moral and interpersonal dilemmas
so that they can work on self-regulation during interactions with psychotherapy clients.
These results support the components of moral sensitivity and moral reasoning as
distinct yet related. Rest has hypothesized that many facets make up each of the
components in his Four Component Model of Moral Behavior, and that various facets
should be studied in isolation to gain an empirical understanding of how the components
relate to each other. The present study isolated the facet of empathy, cognitive and
affective, in the component of moral sensitivity. Despite a strong correlation between
affective empathy and cognitive empathy, these two empathic response styles impacted
moral reasoning differently. This speaks to the importance of adequately assessing
numerous facets of each component to understand fully the dynamics of the relationships
between the components. Additionally, cognitive empathy interacts with moral climate
to cue the moral reasoning process; pointing to the importance of the dynamic interplay
of four components. It is not only important to break-down variables that make up each
of the four components, but also to investigate other intrinsic or extrinsic factors that
could mediate or moderate these relationships (Bebeau, 2002; Rest & Narvaez, 1994;
Rest & Narvaez, 1998; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999; Walker, 2002). These
findings support continued research into the Four Component Model of Moral Behavior,
in addition to the examination of mechanisms that influence the relationships among the
components.
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These findings can be employed to determine important components in clinical
psychologists. Historically, psychologists have been trained to deal with clients on a
cognitive level; that is, to be able to take the clients' perspective to understand the clients'
distress. The present findings reveal that cognitive empathy alone is not a precursor to
moral reasoning during training and that personal distress during perspective taking may
in fact turn off the moral reasoning process. Clinical supervision needs to alert students
to the importance of understanding their own emotional responses to clients and how this
impacts both the therapeutic and supervision experience. Through experiences in clinical
supervision students can learn to self-regulate both affective and cognitive responses to
potential moral dilemmas to be able to facilitate higher levels of moral reasoning when
faced with an ethical dilemma. Eisenberg (2000}, Hoffman (2000), and Pizarro (2000)
stress the importance of effectively managing both types of empathic responses, as over
or under-arousal hinders moral reasoning. In open and supportive supervision
environments, students may feel safe discussing their empathic responses and potential
difficulties in perspective taking and distress. Additionally, supervision experiences may
assist the student to understand and accept that acting morally does not always feel good,
but that to avoid moral action in the hope of avoiding negative feelings is unethical and
irresponsible. This open discussion during supervision may lead to self-awareness of
moral schema activation and advance the moral reasoning process.
Supervision experience provides the opportunity for students to realize that being
empathic, either affectively or cognitively, and effectively managing their empathic
responses leads to advanced decision making skills. Supervision allows for the
opportunity to discuss any vicarious trauma or uncomfortable emotions that the student
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may experience as a result of interaction with clients, to learn that such responses are
normal and to effectively cope with such responses. Additionally, students may also
learn that being empathic does not mean that one is at risk of losing control. That is, an
empathic response must be effectively regulated to avoid over or under-arousal while
allowing for a full understanding of the depths of the clients' experience while knowing
that these are not one's own personal emotions or experiences.
Effective moral reasoning may be blocked by a number of factors, including
prejudice, racism, stereotypes, poor ego-defenses or authoritarianism (Puka, 2002), all of
which have cognitive and emotional components. Puka suggests that by only attempting
to improve moral reasoning without directly addressing potential obstacles to moral
development negates the difficulties one experiences in becoming aware of and in
challenging their moral schema in order to develop more advanced moral reasoning
skills. Quality clinical supervision may assist students' to become aware of personal
biases and assist in challenging these biases to improve awareness of dilemmas and moral
reasoning. Prior research has found that open academic environments and supervision
experiences help students to analyze and challenge their belief systems, thus fostering
moral development, while closed academic environments and supervision experiences do
not lead to gains in moral reasoning (Bebeau, 2002; Collinson, 2001; Good & Cartwright,
1998; Clarkeburn, Downie, & Matthew, 2002; Morton et al, 2001 ). The present study
partially supports these prior findings, indicating that in supervision experiences in which
students perceive role conflicts and ambiguities moral reasoning was not consistently
improved. The students' perception of their clinical supervision impacts whether or not
their personal impediments to advancement in moral reasoning are addressed or not. The
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role of mentor or supervisor includes assisting students to analyze information, reason
critically, and implement decision making (Collinson, 2001~ Clarkebum, et al, 2002).
Morton et al (2000) found that prolonged clinical experiences in medical students
provided the opportunity for development of postformal operations. Through such
activities, that incorporate both cognitive and affective demands, students become aware
of their moral schemas which may then promote advanced moral reasoning.
The 'hidden curriculum' (Bebeau, 2002; Collinson, 2001; Good & Cartwright,
1998; Clarkebum, et al, 2002; Morton, et al, 2001) in professional training is an obstacle
to moral development. In such curriculums students are not encouraged to ask questions,
disagree with supervisors, show any sign of vulnerability for fear of being labeled as
weak or unprofessional, and are unaware of how they will be evaluated. A moral climate
that promotes a 'hidden curriculum' does not encourage or support students' efforts to
become aware of or challenge their moral schema to advance moral reasoning. In fact, a
'hidden curriculum' environment fosters conventional (maintaining norms, rule-based)
reasoning, such that students are expected to follow the unwritten rules without question,
to not challenge their supervisors, and to not put the client needs ahead of personal or
institutional needs. In such environments, perspective taking and affective responses to
clients are discouraged; skills that are necessary to advance beyond conventional
reasoning. That is, 'hidden curriculum' environments do not encourage or promote
postconventional (creating norms) moral schemas or reasoning.
Perceptions of the moral climate impact one's moral sensitivity and its
relationship to moral reasoning. The present study did not find that moral climate
mediates the relationship between moral sensitivity and moral reasoning. That is, moral
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climate does not account for the relationship between moral sensitivity and moral
reasoning. However, moral climate did moderate the relationship between moral
sensitivity, as measured by cognitive empathy, and moral reasoning. When students
perceived low levels of role conflicts and ambiguities in their moral climate, moral
. sensitivity and moral reasoning were associated; however, at higher levels of role
conflicts and ambiguities a consistent relationship between moral sensitivity and moral
reasoning was not found. This finding has implications for the development of moral
sensitivity and moral reasoning. Students who perceive a moral climate in which their
supervision experiences include role conflicts and ambiguities, may be at risk for less
development of moral sensitivity that cues one's awareness of the subtle dilemmas
encountered in the intimacy of a therapeutic setting. In such settings, students may be
aware of explicit ethical violations as described in the ethics code; however, they may not
have developed the skills necessary to move beyond interpreting the ethics code from a
conventional (rule-based) perspective to a postconventional (creating norms) perspective.
Thus, moral schema activation may only occur in situations in which the student is aware
of explicit ethical violations. This lack of sensitivity for subtle or implicit ethical
dilemmas leaves the student vulnerable to engage in unethical behavior when faced with
a morally ambiguous situation. Potential unethical behavior may not be initially
recognized as such; however, over time there is the potential for unethical behavior to
increase and become more explicit (i.e., scheduling a client as the last appointment in
order to spend more time with them, arranging to meet a client outside of the therapy
session, etc.). If the student experienced role conflicts and ambiguities during their
supervision experience, their moral sensitivity may not be activated until after explicit
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ethical violations have occurred as their training did not sufficiently address their lack of
sensitivity to subtle ethical dilemmas.
There are important study limitations that need to be addressed before drawing
conclusions from these data. One main limitation is low power due to a small sample
size and therefore an underestimation of the effects of affective and cognitive empathy on
moral reasoning. Additionally, the use of two covariates, age and supervision valance,
further decreased the power of the analyses. However, despite the low power, the
moderation effect of moral climate in the cognitive empathy and moral reasoning
relationship approached significance providing a meaningful effect. Because the
moderator term approaches significance with such low power, this may be an interesting
avenue to pursue in further study.
Another study limitation was the degree of bias in the moral climate measure.
After controlling for age, group differences were noted between subjects who rated a
positive versus negative supervision experience on the measure of moral climate (role
conflicts and ambiguities). Although the study instructed participants to indicate if they
chose to rate a positive or a negative supervision experience, this rating was not
accounted for in the original plan for data analyses. The study asked participants to
choose a supervision experience that had a significant impact on them. In the future,
those who rate a positive versus negative experience should be analyzed separately.
Given our small sample size, these two groups were collapsed. These differences were
controlled for by using age and supervision valence as covariates; however, separate
analyses on positive and negative raters could focus the examination to determine the
dynamics of the relationship between moral sensitivity and moral reasoning for different
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groups. Future research should account for differences in supervision valence ratings;
either through group comparison and/or by having subjects rate both a positive and
negative supervision experience to understand the differential impact on moral reasoning
within persons. Group comparison may be the more desirable alternative, otherwise
people would have to have had two different supervision experiences in order to meet
inclusion criteria.
Another study limitation was the operationalization of moral climate. King and
Mayhew (2002) recommend that moral climate be assessed using specific indicators
rather than global indicators (such as academic program). The present study attempted to
specify the moral climate using students' perceptions of a clinical experience and the
emotional support within their academic environment. The use of the nurturance scale
did not meet expectations, and was dropped from all analyses, leaving the role conflicts
and ambiguities scale as the only measure of moral climate. The nurturance scale
assessed perceptions of support from their academic institution in general while the role
conflicts and ambiguities scale assessed perceptions of their experience with a clinical
supervisor. In the final analyses only the measure of perceptions of an individual
relationship was retained because nurturance was unrelated to moral reasoning.
However, students' training and development is not only impacted by their one-on-one
relationships with clinical supervisors and mentors, but also with their academic
department and the institution as a whole. A more adequate measure of the moral climate
in future research could address both one-on-one relationships with clinical supervisors
and mentors and the students' perceptions of their overall academic environment. Future
research needs to adequately assess not only clinical supervision experiences but also the
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milieu of the academic experience in its entirety. To do this while also gaining a high
response rate to a lengthy measure will be difficult.
Two components of Rest's Four Component Model of Moral Behavior, moral
sensitivity and moral reasoning, were influence by moral climate. During psychological
training, cognitive empathy alone is insufficient to cue moral reasoning and must interact
with the moral climate in order to cue the moral reasoning process. These findings
address the importance the moral climate in fostering moral sensitivity and moral
development. Specifically, ambiguous or 'hidden curriculum' environments impede
moral sensitivity and moral development. If perspective taking is not moderated by the
supervision environment, it may lead to the experience of personal distress which
interferes with moral reasoning. Confusion and ambiguity in supervision experiences
deters students from learning to recognize the day-to-day moral dilemmas they encounter,
and does not encourage perspective taking and emotional regulation that fosters moral
reasoning. Additionally, when students experience ambiguity or conflict in clinical
supervision they are not provided with the opportunity to understand that they do not
have to take on the emotional distress that a client experiences to act as moral agents or
as therapists. Students need to learn effective self-regulations skills, for both affective
and cognitive empathic responses, to avoid over or under-arousal and to understand how
their empathic response style influences their moral reasoning.
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Appendix A: Recruitment Flyer

DECISION-MAKING & PROFESSIONAL SOC/ALIZA TION
Loma Linda University
Have you ever wondered how your psychological training
has influenced your DECISION-MAKING, both

PROFESSIONALLY & SOC/ALLY?
Those enrolled in Graduate Clinical Psychology Programs
& who have Clinical Experience are invited to participate
in an LLU thesis research study on
DECISION-MAK/NG & PROFESSIONAL SOC/ALIZA TION
The study will examine the impact of academic and professional training on decisionmaking processes. Given that psychologists strive to help clients within an interpersonal
context, it is important to determine how interpersonal decision-making develops during
psychological training. All responses will be anonymous. There will be no cost to you,
other than 1 hour of your time to fill out the

DECISION-MAKING SURVEY.

Studv oarticipants can enter a raffle to win one of
two $50 Gift Certificates for Amazon.com!
If you'd like to participate or more information, please
contact
Marita Mahoney at (909) 558-8165 or
mmahoney06g@univ.llu.edu. You may also contact the
research study supervisor at kmorton@univ.llu.edu.

We look forward to hearing from you!
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Appendix B: Informed Consent
October 14, 2002
Dear
My name is Marita Mahoney and I am currently enrolled in the Psychology Ph.D.
program at Loma Linda University. I am conducting the current project for my Master's thesis
requirement. I am interested in studying how our training experiences influence our decisionmaking in interpersonal situations. You recently received a flyer regarding this study in your
student mailbox and have volunteered to participate. I am inviting you, a graduate student in
Clinical Psychology, to complete the enclosed survey about the impact of your training
experiences on decision-making in emotional and interpersonal situations. Your responses will
assist in understanding how graduate psychology students make decisions.
This study will examine the impact of student perceptions of their academic and
professional training on their decision-making process. As psychologists-in-training, we will be
faced with a variety of ethical and ambiguous situations; it is important for our training to prepare
us to effectively and actively manage these situations. To our knowledge, this is the first study
examining this relationship in psychological training. Given that psychologists strive to help and
not harm their clients, it is necessary and beneficial to study how decisions are made in the
context of interpersonal relationships.
The survey will take approximately one hour to complete, and it requires attention and
concentration, as the items ask you to demonstrate your decision-making process on five
vignettes. The risks are minimal, no greater than those encountered when you reason about
dilemmas in your everyday life. Your participation is voluntary, there is no penalty for not
participating and you can choose to withdraw at any time. As a fellow graduate student, I fully
understand that this is a lot of time to ask you to put aside to complete this survey. Yet, I believe
that the information this study will provide to psychology programs and what you learn about
yourself in the process may be very enlightening. As competent and effective future
psychologists, it is important for us to know how we react interpersonal situations. Your
department will receive the results from the overall study. For your participation in this study
you are offered a chance to win one of two $50.00 Gift Certificates from Amazon.com. Just fill
out the enclosed pre-stamped postcard with you name and contact information and mail it
separately from the survey. At the conclusion of this study, two postcards will be randomly
drawn to each receive one Gift Certificate.
With this in mind, and the knowledge that everything you answer here is anonymous, I
hope that you will decide to complete this survey and return it to us in the Psychology
Department at Loma Linda University. All information will be number-coded and you should not
write your name on the survey. Please take the time right now to complete this survey, insert it
into the self-addressed, stamped envelope provided and mail it to us.
If you have any questions about this project, please do not hesitate to contact, myself,
Marita Mahoney at (909) 558-8165 or mmahoney06g@univ.llu.edu, or Dr. Kelly Morton,
Research Committee Chair, at (909) 558-8165. You may also contact an impartial third party not
involved with this study at (909) 558-4647 with any concerns about this project.
Thank you in advance for you time and cooperation in this important project.
Sincerely,

Marita L. Mahoney, M.A.,
Psychology Doctoral Student

Kelly R. Morton, Ph.D.
Associate Professor, Research Supervisor
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Appendix C: Survey

®~cision Making

and
Prof~ssional

~ocialization

Marita L. Mahoney, M.A.
Kelly R. Morton, Ph.D.
Department of Psychology

Loma Linda University
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Decision Making & Professional Socialization
Loma Linda University
·
Department of Psychology
Surveyinstructions & how to enter the

raffle

Please fill out all parts of the sutVey - at a convenient time for you.
Part L· on the Defining Issues Test-2 you will rate your values & priorities in
interpersonal decision-making. The questions are challenging & thought
provoking! The DIT-2 has 2 parts - Instructions & an Answer Sheet. It is printed
in red ink, & takes most people about 30 minutes.

Part //includes questions about your academic & professional
training. It is printed on yellow paper, & will take about 10 minutes.
Return Parts I & //in the addressed stamped envelope without bending or
folding the materials!

Now comes the fun part!
Enter a raffle to win 1of2 $50.00 Gift Certificates for Amazon.com!!!
Take 20 seconds to fill in your telephone# or email on the addressed stamped
postcard so we can contact you if you win.
To ensure survey anonymity, please return the postcard separatelvtrom
the survey materials.
Thanks for your participation!! We hope that you've learned something about
yourself & your professional development. If you have any questions, please do
not hesitate to contact Marita Mahoney at (909) 558-8165 or
mmahoney06g@univ.llu.edu, or Dr. Kelly Morton, Thesis Committee Chair, at (909)
558-8165.
Marita L. Mahoney, M.A.
Psychology Doctoral Student
Loma Linda University

Kelly R. Morton, Ph.D.,
Associate Professor, Research
Supervisor
Loma Linda University

Don't forget to return the raffle postcard for vour chance to win!!!!
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Please tell us a little about yourself. Please darken the circle that best represents
your answer.
1.

What Graduate psycholo2v proeram are you currendy enrolled in?
M.A.

M.S.

Psy.D.

Ph.D.

Other:

0

0

0

0

0

la. Please indicate program type:

Clinical

Experimental

0
lb.

2.

0

What year of the Graduate Psycholof!Y pro2ram are you currently in?
1st

2nd

3rd

4th

5th

6th

7th

Other

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

What deerees have you completed?
B.A/B.S.

M.F.T.

M.D.

J.D.

0

0

0

0

Masters (specify program):

Doctorate (specify
program):

0

0

3.

Please list any professional licenses that you hold:

4.

Please list any professional &/or student affiliations that you are a member of:

5.

Please indicate how many professional poster &/or paper
presentations you have been an author on:
Please indicate the number of publications you have been an
author on:

6.

I

The following statements inquire about your thoughts and
feelings in a variety of situations. For each item, indicate how
well it describes you by darkening the appropriate circle. Read
each item carefully before responding. Answer as honestly as you
can.

7.

I daydream & fantasize, with some regularity, about things
that might happen to me.

8.

I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less
fortunate than me.
I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other
euy's" point of view.
Sometimes I do not feel sorry for people when they are
havine problems.
I really get involved with the feelings of characters in a
novel
In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive & ill at ease.
I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, & I do
not often 2et completely cauaht up in it.

9.
10.
11.

12.
13.
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0

0

0

0

0
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The following statements inquire about your thoughts and
feelings in a variety of situations. For each item, indicate how
well it describes you by darkening the appropriate circle. Read
each item carefully before responding. Answer as honestly as you
can.
14.
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I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I
make a decision.
When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of
protective of him or her.
I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very
emotional situation.
I sometimes try to understand my friends better by
imaginina how things look from their perspective.
Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is
extremely rare for me.
When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm.
Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a
2reat deal.
If I am sure I am right about something, I do not waste
much time listening to other people's arguments.

0

0

0

0 0

0

0

0

0 0

0

0

0

0 0

0

0

0

0 0

0

0

0

0 0

0

0

0

0 0

0

0

0

0 0

0

0

0

0 0

22.

After seeing a play or a movie, I have felt as though I were
one of the characters.

0

0

0

0 0

23.
24.

Being in a tense emotional situation scares me.
When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes do
not feel very much pity for him or her.
I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies.

0

0

0

0 0

0

0

0

0 0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0 0
0 0

0

0
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0 0
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15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

33.
34.

I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.
I believe that there are two sides to every question and try
to look at both of them.
I would describe myself as a pretty softhearted person.
When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in
the place of a leadin2 character.
I tend to lose control during emergencies.
When I am upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in
their shoes" for a while.
When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine
how I would feel if the events in the story were happening
tome.
When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency,
I eo to pieces.
Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would
feel if I were in their place.
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35.
36.
37.
38.

~

~~

~~

The faculty is reserved & distant toward me.
This department takes an interest in my personal welfare.
When giving criticism or answering a question, faculty
appear to be eenuinely interested in helpine me.
The faculty appears to regard their teaching responsibilities
as a burden.
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how well each statement describes your perception of the
Psychology Department at this institution by darkening the
appropriate circle.
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The following statements describe some concerns that psychologists-in-training may
.
d unngc
.
linial
expenence
c supervision.
Rate the degree to which each concern was an issue for you by
darkening the appropriate circle. Consider the ONE
CLINICAL SUPERVISION experience that had the greatest
impact, either positive or negative, on your professional
develonment.
39.
40.
41.

42.

43.
44.

45.

46.

47.
48.

Was this supervision experience:

Positive

Negative

0

0

I was uncertain about what material to present to my
supervisor.
I felt that my supervisor was incompetent or less
competent than I. I often felt as if I was supervising
him/her.
I wanted to challenge the appropriateness of my
supervisor's recommendations for using a technique with
one of my clients, but I thought it better to keep my
opinions to myself.
I was not sure how best to use supervision as I became
more experienced.
I believed that my supervisor's behavior in one or more
situations was unethical or illegal & I was undecided
about whether to confront him/her.
My orientation to therapy was different from that of my
supervisor. My supervisor wanted to work with clients
using his/her framework & I felt that I should be allowed
to use my own approach.
I have wanted to intervene with one of my clients in a
particular way & my supervisor has wanted me to
approach the client in a very different way. I am expected
to judge both what is appropriate for myself & also to do
what I am told.
My supervisor expected me to come prepared for
supervision, but I had no idea how or what to prepare.
I was not sure how autonomous I should be in my work
with clients.
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49.

My supervisor told me to do something I perceived to be
ille2al or unethical & I was expected to comply.

0

0

0

0

0
Q

00

Consider the ONE CLINICAL SUPERVISION experience that
had the greatest impact, either positive or negative, on your
professional development
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

55.

56.

57.

58.

59.
60.

61.

62.
63.
64.

65.
66.

My supervisor's criteria for evaluating my work were not
specific.
I was not sure that I had done what the supervisor
expected me to do in a session with a client.
The criteria for evaluating my performance in
supervision were not clear.
I got mixed signals from my supervisor & I was unsure of
which shmals to attend to.
When using a new technique, I was unclear about the
specific steps involved. Consequently, I was uncertain
how my supervisor would evaluate my work.
I disagreed with my supervisor about how to introduce a
specific issue to a client, but I also wanted to do what the
supervisor recommended.
Part of me wanted to rely on my own instincts with
clients, but I always knew that my supervisor would have
the last word.
The feedback I got from my supervisor did not help me to
know what was expected of me in my day-to-day work
with clients.
I was not comfortable using a technique recommended by
my supervisor; however, I felt that I should do what my
supervisor recommended.
Everything was new & I was not sure what would be
expected of me.
I was not sure if I should discuss my professional
weaknesses in supervision because I was not sure how
they would be evaluated.
I disagreed with my supervisor about implementing a
specific technique, but I also wanted to do what the
supervisor thou2ht best.
My supervisor gave me no feedback & I felt lost.
My supervisor told me what to do with a client, but did
not 2ive me very specific ideas about how to do it.
My supervisor wanted me to pursue an assessment
technique that I considered inappropriate for a particular
client.
There were no clear guidelines for my behavior in
supervision.
The supervisor gave no constructive or negative feedback
& consequently, I did not know how to address my
weaknesses.
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67.

I did not know how I was doing as a therapist &,
consequently, I did not know how my supervisor would
evaluate me.

0

0

0

0

0

68.

I was unsure of what to expect from my supervisor.

0

0

0

0

0

69.

How long ago did you receive this supervision?

70.

How long did this supervision experience last?

71.

73.

In total, how many months or years of clinical supervision
have you had in your clinical trainin2 experience?
In total, how many supervisors, including this one, have you
had in your clinical trainin2 experience?
How old are you?

74.

Please indicate your gender:

72.

Male

Female

0

0

Thank you so much for your involvement Don't forget to fill out the enclosed
postcard for your chance to be entered in the raffle to win one of two, $50.00 Gift
Certificates for Amazon.com. To ensure anonymity, please return the postcard
separately from the survey materials.

H you would like to make any additional comments please do so below or include a
separate sheet.

Appendix D: Raffie Entry Postcard
Thank you for participating in this research project. For your participation, you may
enter a raffie for a chance to win one of two $50.00 Gift Certificates for Amazon.com.
To enter, just fill in an email address or telephone number where we may contact you if
you are one of the raffle winners. Take a couple of seconds now and send in for your
chance to win!!!
Where may we contact you if you are a raffle w i n n e r ? - - - - - - - - - - - Thank you!
Marita L. Mahoney, M.A.

Kelly R. Morton, Ph.D.

Psychology Graduate Student

Associate Professor

p.s. remember to return the raffle entry postcard and the survey materials separately, and do not
write your name on either the raffle entry postcard or the survey materials.
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Dear (insert name)
Approximately two weeks ago you received a copy of the Decision-Making Survey. We would
like to take this opportunity to thank.you for participating in this research project. If you have not
already done so, please take the time now to complete the survey and return it to us. Remember
to also return separately, the raffle postcard to enter for your chance to win one of two $50.00
Gift Certificates for Amazon.com. If you need to have another survey sent to you, please do not
hesitate to contact us; mmahoney06g@univ.llu.edu, (909) 558-8165.
Thank you!
Marita L. Mahoney, M.A.
Psychology Graduate Student

Kelly R. Morton, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
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